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A General Outlook of the Work
This work relates to income inequalities studied from two different perspectives: ICT
innovation (Chapter 1-2) and bargaining among social groups (Chapter 3-4). ICT
innovation affects the number of jobs but also the structure of the labor market, with
important consequences on income distribution. ICT innovation could destroy more
jobs than it creates, for the first time since the beginning of industrialization; mean-
while the advanced ICT softwares are reducing that professions typically associated
with the middle class, in favor of those that lies to the extremes of pays. On the
other hand, the ability of each social group to attract resources is a second source
of movements in income distribution; in particular, bargaining can take place within
each company (firms versus trade-unions) and within the government (political par-
ties competing to impose welfare regime).
In Chapter 1 we estimate the effect of internet revolution on the number of jobs. The
fourth industrial revolution, which began with the rise of internet technology, is now
seeing the development of increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence software.
One consequence of such development is the ever-more serious risk posed for jobs.
Chapter 1 shall examine this phenomenon in three steps; first, we shall empirically
show that productivity growth over the last two decades was led by ICT; secondly, we
shall discuss whether these productivity gains have affected the structure of employ-
ment by examining the data coming from 16 OECD countries and how such outcomes
may be linked to innovation in ICT. Finally, a forecasting logistic model on the evo-
lution of employment will be provided, projecting that by 2040-50 unemployment
and atypical forms of work will affect 60% of the workforce in most of the countries
observed.
In Chapter 2 we observe the structure of job market over the last 25 years in or-
der to find which professions have expanded and which ones have reduced and then
we link this outcome to middle class thinning and the consequent income inequality
growth. The underlying hypothesis is that ICT innovations are changing job struc-
tures, at least in the most industrialized countries. Firstly, this chapter takes the
studies of Acemoglu and Autor (2010) and Goos et al. (2009) as a starting point and
then updates their results for 16 European countries. The outcome we have found
is an accentuation of the dynamics already observed in the literature. On the one
hand, the number of non-routine jobs has increased while routine ones (both skilled
and non-skilled) have become fewer; on the other hand, while the number of both
low-paid and high-paid jobs has risen, those with average compensation have fallen
almost everywhere. The consequence is a progressive thinning of the middle class and
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a change in income distribution among Western populations. Secondly, Chapter 2
links these findings with the recent intensification of the populist phenomenon. We
shall be discussing an original theory, consistent both with the literature and with
the empirical evidence, which describes the populist origins and its future prospects.
In Chapter 3 shift our consideration to the social dynamic of inequalities. Income
inequalities increase and decrease according to the capability of each social group in
appropriating the national added value. The final outcome of this partition may be
seen reflected on the price level. The lasting debate about the origins of inflation has
determined two opposing approaches: monetarism and bargaining. The aim of Chap-
ter 3 is to put these aspects together in an innovative synthesis. To investigate this
item, we used an Input-Output (IO) approach and we developed an original mathe-
matical process to define the real price index variations. After that, we tested this
theoretical definition with an empirical study on Italian inflation over 30 years where
we elaborated 31 official I-O tables compiled by the Italian statistics bureau (ISTAT).
By this verified definition, inflation is strictly due to the level of wages and profits.
This level, in turn, depends both on monetary government intervention (monetarist
approach) and on collective bargaining among trade-unions and stakeholders (classic
bargaining approach). Finally, by this model, theoretical implications are derived and
summed up in six different settings ceteris paribus.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we link income inequalities to Health Systems in a European
perspective. With a sociological slant, we compare European countries in the context
of neoliberal era, focusing on healthy life years for elderly (HLY65+). Firstly, we out-
line the theoretical state of the art in the literature on health inequalities, stressing
the important relationship that links health inequalities to geographic area. In the
second part of Chapter 4 we observe data relating to the changes of HLY65+ in the
European member states and we correlate these results with the income inequality
measured by the Gini index. The last part of Chapter 4 advance some comments on
health inequalities in the context of the neoliberal era and in relation to geographic







Web, Big Data, Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence respectively represent
the nervous system, the memory, the physical body and the mind of a gigantic sys-
tem that in a few decades could definitively replace human beings in all kinds of
work (Kurzweil, 2005). According to a report by the World Economic Forum (2016),
we are only at the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution. Developments in
the GNR (Genetics, Nanotechnology and Robotics) sectors are amplifying, opening
up new possibilities for production and consumption that were previously unimagin-
able. If it is true that we have just entered the age of a new industrial revolution,
then we need to identify the single, most important invention of our era; to highlight
the technology which has allowed the emergence of such a vast range of innovative
sectors and applications. Every industrial revolution has had its pivotal technology.
Innovations such as the steam engine (first industrial revolution), electricity (second
industrial revolution) and electronics (third industrial revolution), are called General
Purpose Technologies (GPTs). The economic historian Gavin Wright offers a simple
definition: GPTs are deeply innovative ideas or techniques that can potentially have
a major impact on many sectors of the economy. "Impact" in this case means that
many sectors will see a remarkable boost in productivity. Information and Commu-
nication Technology (ICT), and specifically the World Wide Web, is the GPT of the
fourth industrial revolution, which began in the late 1990s. Most economic historians
concur with the assessment that ICT meets all of the criteria to be considered as
GPTs. In fact, in a list of all the candidates for this classification compiled by the
economist Alexander Field, only steam power got more votes than ICT, which was
tied with electricity as the second most commonly accepted GPT.
In this paper we firstly investigate the impact of ICTs on productivity growth over sev-
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eral industrialized countries and secondly we evaluate the effect of productivity growth
on the employment structure. As for the first step, the economic research on this item,
typically proxied the drivers of productivity through investments in Research and De-
velopment (R&D) as in Griliches (1979), Patel and Soete (1988), Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) and O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009). However, since
the mid-1990s, the economic literature has also focused on ICT as source of produc-
tivity growth in industrialized countries (Venturini, 2009; Pieri, 2018). Moreover,
Polder et al. (2017), considered ICT the main infrastructure of knowledge economies
(i.e. R&D-based). Like in Pieri (2018), we estimate the impact of ICTs on produc-
tivity growth, foscusing on the improtance of capital stocks in ICT, RD and non-ICT
economic sectors. Secondly, we also consider the spillover channel, which recognized
the possibility for technological investments in ICT to promote the diffusion of knowl-
edge across firms and countries (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Tambe and Hitt, 2014;
Marsh et al., 2017). We found that productivity growth over the last 20 years has
been mainly lead by ICTs.
In the second step we wonder which is the impact of productivity growth on em-
ployment within the fourth industrial revolution. This is a controversial issue in
literature. Economists have been arguing for two centuries that the final effect of
innovation on jobs should be positive. Ricardo’s famous chapter on machinery sug-
gests that labour saving technology reduces the demand for undifferentiated labour,
thus leading to technological unemployment (Ricardo, 1817). As economists have
long understood, however, an invention that replaces workers with machines will have
effects on product and factor markets alike. An increase in the efficiency of produc-
tion which reduces the price of one good, will increase real income and thus increase
demand for other goods. Hence, in short, technological progress has two competing
effects on employment (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). Firstly, as technology replaces
labour, there is a destructive effect, requiring employers to reallocate their labour
supply; and secondly, there is the capitalization effect, as more companies enter in-
dustries where productivity is relatively high, leading employment in those industries
to expand. Which will prevail in the fourth industrial revolution?
While technological innovations and software development around ICT technologies
are full of enormous potential, on the other hand, their ability to replace even the
most intellectual jobs is worrying many economists who have trouble predicting what
would happen in a scenario with less and less need for human work. A number of
books, some quite alarmist and pessimistic (Keen 2015; Carr 2015), some more cau-
tious and optimistic (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 2014; Ford 2009, 2015; Pistono
2012; Cowen 2013; Kaplan 2015; Rifkin 1997, 2014), have been published arguing
that ours is an age of increasing technological unemployment. These books have
been complemented by research papers highlighting the rise of automation and the
increasing share of income being taken by capital in Western economies (Frey and
Osborne 2013; Fleck, Glaser and Sprague 2011; ILO 2013; Pratt 2015; Sachs et al.
2015). These have in turn been complemented by the work of a number of leading
journalists and economic opinion writers (Packer 2013; Krugman 2012, 2013). The
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gravity of this scenario is not only a question of the risk of job losses, but also a
paradigmatic change in the quality of future jobs. Among the factors leading these
great changes that are bound to have a disruptive influence on the first half of the
21st century, participants in an extremely large-sample survey at the World Economic
Forum (2014) listed new technologies in first place.
Furthermore, in this paper we estimate the impact of productivity on the employ-
ment. Moreover, we extend these regressions also to and index that we introduce
as a novelty in this paper which adds to the unemployment rate, two categories of
data from atypical contractual forms of work: involuntary part-time and temporary
jobs. The evolution of these types of jobs over time shows how the structure of job
market has changed. We call the sum of the unemployment rate, involuntary part-
time and temporary job rate Labour Devaluation Rate (LDR). One of the novelties
of this paper is just that we run our analysis and estimation considering not only the
unemployment rate but also the wider concept expressed by LDR. Our estimations
suggest that from 1995 to 2016, the productivity growth has positively impacted both
unemployment and LDR. Recalling that productivity has increased mainly because of
ICT innovation, according to the finings of step 1, we will conclude that ICT innova-
tions are causing a severe reversion of the productivity historical effect on employment.
In Section 2 of this paper we observe the unemployment rate and LDR over a long
period, starting from the 70s and 80s (according to the availability of the OECD
dataset), in 16 industrialized OECD countries. In Section 3, we run a fine panel
estimate to prove that productivity growth over the last 15 years has been mainly
led by ICT and by the replacement of the workforce in favor of capital. Therefore,
we can update the empirical evidence already stated in past literature; moreover our
dataset is one of the largest ever used in this field (over 4200 observations), reinforc-
ing the validity of our outcome. In Section 4, we advance an estimation model to
regress LDR on the average hourly productivity trend of the economy. We plug the
productivity growth rate and the appropriate control variables suggested by literature
into the model as independent variables for LDR. We are trying to find out whether
productivity growth has positively affected employment in these 16 countries. If this
is the case, we can use the findings of Section 3 (i.e. that productivity growth is
mainly caused by R&D and ICT, as supported by Pieri et al. 2018; Cardona et al.
2013; Dahl, 2011) to conclude that ICT innovation has positively affected the long-
term LDR trend. In the end, in Section 5, we use the same estimating equation to
predict in which year countries could reach an LDR rate of 60%, ceteris paribus. Our
estimations point to a grave forecast in terms of the rate of LDR.
1.2 Some General Statistics
In this Section we are going to illustrate some statistics about developed countries and
long-term unemployment. The general hypothesis behind this comparison is proofing
that the long-term unemployment is increasing. In the next sections we would link
this observed trend to ICT innovations, controlling for structural reforms of job mar-
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ket. We shall start from the classical unemployment data provided by OECD and
than we go ahead. We selected intentionally only industrialized countries, because it
is here that the most advanced automated technologies have been applied first, and
it is therefore from here that you can see upcoming venture trends1. Moreover we
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Figure 1.2: Rate of unemployment as % of Labour Force, 1985-2017, OECD
1These countries are: USA, UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands, France, Japan.
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Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show that the unemployment trend has not been constant over
the period considered. We can only observe that there are two big waves, easily
connectable to the dot.com bubble burst between the period 1997-2003, and to the
Financial global crisis started in USA between 2008-2014. However, if we only look at
unemployment data we cannot observe a constant long-term increasing trend, there-
fore we could initially conclude that ICT innovation and other structural reforms in
the job market, has not affected occupational levels.
However, as McKinsey (2015) pointed out, the new digital technologies will not elim-
inate jobs all at once, but more likely will gradually replace some parts of them,
changing the quality of human work. For this reason, the time series on unemploy-
ment do not exhibit a stable upward trend. The problem with this simplified approach
then, as McKinsey would suggest, is that it looks only at unemployment, which is
the final effect of job robotization. On the contrary, it is not enough to consider only
unemployment per se; we need to also examine how the labor market has evolved
in recent decades. If in the 70s and 80s, for example, permanent jobs, workplace
stability and career opportunities for seniority were all consolidated realities; nowa-
days the physiognomy of job market has been distorted. The introduction of new
atypical job contracts has created the so-called gig economy. It has largely favored
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Figure 1.4: Temporary workers as % of employment, 1985-2017, OECD
Data reported in Figure 1.3-1.4, provided by OECD statistics, show the percentage of
temporary workers related to the total employment. According to OECD, temporary
workers statistics "include wage and salary workers whose job has a pre-determined
termination date. National definitions broadly conform to this generic definition, but
may vary depending on national circumstances. This indicator is broken down by age
group and it is measured as percentage of dependent employees (i.e. wage and salary
workers)". Unlike the data on unemployment, data describing the percentage of em-
ployees who are only temporary workers show a much more definite trend, common
to a whole range of countries and generally on the rise. For the countries in which
provide the longest time series (compiled until 1983), it is also possible to observe
that in the early 1980s temporary employment was largely limited to a minority of
employees. In France, for example, it was just 3.34% against the current 16.89%, in
Italy it was 6.61% in 1983 against 15.4% in 2017, and similarly for all other countries
where the values in 1983 never exceeded 5-6% of the workforce.
Historical trends in temporary employment are showing that a change in the way
work is structured is underway, first of all, in terms of quality. If at the beginning
of the 1980s almost all contracts offered permanent employment, today this is no
longer the case. A massive wave of precariousness has invaded the labor market. The
percentage of new types of contracts, characterized by short-term employment, is no
longer negligible. This trend is precisely what the World Economic Forum was pre-
dicting (2016) when it spoke of peer-to-peer and crowdsourcing platforms. Moreover,
these data refer to the total employed population, thus they include those whose jobs
are still governed by the collective labor contracts drafted in the previous period. This
systematically leads to a gross underestimation of the extent of the phenomenon. To
predict the future trends we could observe the conditions under which people are em-
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ployed today. To know the real dynamics towards which we are moving, we could take
into consideration temporary-employment data only referred to young people (15-24
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Figure 1.6: Temporary workers as % of employment (15-24 years), 1985-2017, OECD
First of all, it must be said that job instability among young people is tradition-
ally higher compared with the rate of temporary work inclusive of all age groups.
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However, the percentage of precarious workers among young people has exploded
over the last 30 years, reaching unprecedented levels in the history of social statis-
tics (during peacetime), passing from rates of approximately 10-20% to 40% in most
countries, while even exceeding 50% in many others. In Germany, Holland, Italy,
France and Portugal, rates of job precariousness for youth have even reached as high
as 60%. These data should not be interpreted, for instance, to state that Italy offers
rosier labour market perspectives than its German counterpart. The graphs show that
youth precarious employment has grown enormously since the 1990s, faster than total
temporary worker rates. This means that the job contracts enjoyed by the previous
generation have not been offered to the new ones, radically changing the job market
structure in the direction of becoming progressively more and more unstable, fluid,
indefinite.
Moreover, there is also an other labour force statistics that we should observe in
order to study the evolution of job market structure: those people who have perma-
nent jobs but are forced into involuntary part-time. A lot of companies, in order to
avoid bankruptcy or the need to fire a significant component of their employees, have
created mandatory part-time plans. However the final economic effect is the same: a
reduction in the number of hours worked and therefore in costs (payroll). This phe-
nomenon, as shown in the following graphs, is affecting an ever-increasing percentage
of workers and could be linked to new technologies (as we will be examining). OECD
statistics provide this data, splitting voluntary from involuntary part-time jobs. Ac-
cording to OECD, a person is considered an involuntary permanent part-time worker
if he/she declared his/her inability to find a permanent full-time work. In almost all
industrialized countries, the percentage of permanent non-voluntary part-time work-

























Belgium Denmark Germany Luxembourg
Netherlands United Kingdom United States

























France Greece Italy Japan Spain Portugal
Figure 1.8: Share of involuntary part-timers in Labour Force, 1985-2017, OECD
In 1985 only 1-2% of permanent workers were involved in this phenomenon; in 2016
the share rose on average to 4-5% with peaks in Italy (10%) and in Spain (7%).
Now we are ready to build-up a new and simply indicator to measure the job mar-
ket structure. We shall sum the unemployment rate, the rate of temporary jobs and
the rate of involuntary part-time workers (adjusted on workforce and referred to all
age groups) getting a statistics which helps to describe the evolution of real labour
conditions, revealing much more significant information than that obtained consider-
ing the unemployment rate alone. The sum of all these components, that represents
forms of atypical work, in addition, reveals a long-term trend, which is not so evi-
dent if one only observes the trend of unemployment, but it is consistent with the
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Figure 1.10: % people without a permanent full-time employment on total labour force, 1995-2016,
OECD
The rates so calculated allow us to grasp the epochal leap in progress into the new
millennium. The traditional position of permanent employment, within a stable work-
place over time, with career prospects for seniority, with a team of colleagues working
together towards common results, which had been the most typical form of work, is
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gradually becoming itself a form of atypical work. This scenario is already evident
when observing the same statistics for youth. If this trend does not reverse, within
the next 20 years the percentages now affecting youth employment specifically, will
expand to describe the total workforce, with unpredictable economic, political and
social consequences.
Finally, let us define the arithmetic sum of the unemployment rate, the rate of tempo-
rary workers and the rate of involuntary part-time workers as the Labor Devaluation
Rate (LDR), a measure which put together unemployment and underemployment.
LDR can be calculated both for total and young workforce, even if in this study we
will consider LDR only for total workforce. These three variables can be summed since
they are each other independent: the unemployed rate does not include temporary
and involuntary part-time workers since they are classified as employed; involuntary
part-time workers do not include temporary workers since OECD only counts part-
time workers with permanent contracts. The increase in LDR implies that the total
number of hours worked has decreased with regard to the active population. The
trends presented in the table unequivocally demonstrate that we are in a slow but
progressive withdrawal of human labor from the economy. We have not yet reached
unemployment rates of 20-30% (Except for Portugal and Spain), but we are headed in
that direction by reducing the number of hours worked in a working day (involuntary
part-time workers), increasing the number of gig jobs (i.e. jobs on call, therefore fewer
loads of working hours), and ultimately raising the number of temporary jobs con-
tracts in comparison with permanent ones. The substantial increase in LDR will be
connected, in the following sections, to the ICT innovation, controlled by structural
reforms in the job market.
1.3 R&D and ICT Impact on Productivity Growth
In this section we want to find out what the impact of ICT has been on total pro-
ductivity growth for the 11 most industrialized OECD-member countries: USA, UK,
Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, Germany, (The) Netherlands, Luxemburg, Austria,
Denmark and Finland. To this end, we have been examining data compiled from
2000 to 2014 (the last year available) by EU KLEMS and WIOD. We chose the
most industrialized countries since these are where the impact of ICT on productivity
growth is expected to be highest, thus they can best provide a glimpse of what will
most likely happen in the future for the less developed countries. The survey was lim-
ited to these particular 11 countries due to a lack of data for the other industrialized
nations2.
In literature, productivity in ICT impact analysis is classically measured in terms of
total factor productivity (TFP), derived by the constant term pre-multiplied before
2In the next section we shall continue considering these same 11 countries, but we will also need
other kinds of data which will be provided by OECD. Thanks to the availability of the OECD
database, in the next sectio we will be able to add other five countries (Greece, Portugal, Japan,
Belgium and Canada) to our analysis.
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the Cobb-Douglas function (Griliches, 1998; Gholami, 2009; Strobel, 2016; Ahmed,
2017). This classical approach is based on the assumption that competitive input
markets (each input is paid to its marginal product) and input exhaustion (all rev-
enue is paid to factors) lead to a condition of equilibrium in which an input’s factor
share equals its output elasticity. However, when the neoclassical assumptions fail,
the TFP found by the Cobb-Douglas function may provide a poor approximation of
true productivity. This failure could reflect production spillovers, omitted variables,
embodied technological progress, measurement error or reverse causality, all of which
could lead to a positive link between TFP growth and ICT intensity. Since we want
to find this link between productivity and ICT capital and determine its intensity,
we will use hourly productivity as our unit of measurement. Of the readily available
statistical aggregates, in fact, GDP per hour worked is, in principle, the most relevant
for productivity comparisons across the OECD countries (Wingender 2018). In prac-
tice, it is particularly useful when comparing productivity growth, as we are doing in
this paper.
Moreover, hourly productivity automatically accounts for all the current economic
effects of all past and recent innovation. Only technical progress, in fact, can explain
how the same single hour of human labor can produce more goods or services in one
year than in another. Hourly productivity is derived from the ratio between the added
value (of countries or industrial sectors) expressed at constant US PPP, and the total
number of hours worked (in the country or in the industrial sector). Using hourly
productivity, moreover, makes it possible to correct the effect of economic crises that
cut jobs but do not necessarily reduce productivity. Therefore, following the approach






Where ρ is the hourly productivity and y is the added value of a firm/industrial sec-
tor/country and H is the total amount of hours worked in the same firm/industrial
sector/country.
Now we need to explicate a relationship between ICT and hourly productivity. The
model used for analyzing the role of ICT in productivity growth is built on the tra-
ditional production function approach (Griliches, 1998). In particular, we adopt the
Cobb-Douglas functional form, which has been widely used in previous studies analyz-
ing the impact of ICT on business performance (Alpar and Kim, 1991; Brynjolfsson,
1996). Starting from the production function of Gholami et al. (2009) we assume the
production function as follows:
Yi,j,t = A(λi,j,t;Si,j,t)f(ICTi,j,t, NICTi,j,t, Hi,j,t) (1.2)
Where Y is the added value of sector i for country j at time t, A is the shift parame-
ter which is dependent on an unobserved technical change parameter λ; the spillover
effects of knowledge S; ICT is the ICT Capital employed by each sector i of each
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country j for each year t; NICT is the non-ICT Capital employed; H are the total
hours worked within the sector i. λ varies across sectors (αi) and over time according
to ICT · t, an interaction between time trend and ICT capital stock which describes
the specific technical change over the period.
Considering that the capital of ICT may not be the only contributor to knowledge
capital, we also include the national R&D effort in knowledge capital production.
These stocks are built from annual investment flows by means of the perpetual in-
ventory method and by adopting an asset-specific rate of geometric depreciation. As
a measure of R&D input, we use the cumulative value of industry research and de-
velopment investments provided by EU-KLEMS database; we construct this stock by
imposing a standard depreciation rate of 15% as in Pieri (2018). We must consider
R&D because its impact on productivity growth may be strong and statistical signi-
ficative. By doing so we counter the omitted variable problem. If we did not take
into account the effect of R&D, we would have overestimated the impact of ICT on
productivity growth. Therefore S(ICT,R&D) and λ depends also on R&D · t. As-
suming a Cobb-Douglas functional form of A(.), (2) can be rewritten as follows after
substitutions:
Yi,j,t = e
λi,j,tICT β1NICT β2HθR&Dβ3Sγ (1.3)
Where:
λi,j,t = β7ICTi,j,t · t+ β8R&Di,j,t · t+ αi,j + νi,j,t
Taking the Log-form:
yi,j,t = β1ln(ICTi,j,t) + β2ln(NICTi,j,t) + θln(Hi,j,t) + β4ln(R&Di,j,t)+
+ γln(Si,j,t) + β7ICTi,j,t · t+ β8R&Di,j,t · t+ αi,j + εi,j,t
(1.4)
Where yi,j,t is the logarithm of added value Yi,j,t, R&Di,j,t is the intermediate con-
sumption on Research and Development for industrial sector i, country j and year t
and εi,j,t is the error term .
Now, we add and subtract 1 to the parameter θ for hours worked as follows:
yi,j,t = β1ln(ICTi,j,t) + β2ln(NICTi,j,t) + (θ − 1)ln(Hi,j,t) + ln(Hi,j,t)+
+ β4ln(R&Di,j,t) + γln(Si,j,t) + β7ICTi,j,t · t+ β8R&Di,j,t · t+ αi,j + εi,j,t
(1.5)
Now, we move on the right hand of the equation (3) ln(Hi,j,t) and by logarithm pro-
prieties3:
ρi,j,t = β1ln(ICTi,j,t) + β2ln(NICTi,j,t) + β3ln(Hi,j,t) + β4ln(R&Di,j,t)+
+ β7ICTi,j,t · t+ β8R&Di,j,t · t+ γln(Si,j,t) + αi,j + εi,j,t
(1.6)
Where β3 = θ − 1.





= ρi,j,t, recalling that y = ln(Y ).
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Finally, we have to specify the form of S which captures the spillover effects of ICT
and R&D. According to existing literature, ICT and R&D induce indirect effects on
productivity growth. These effects typically take the form of network externalities and
knowledge spillovers induced by better idea circulation and information management
(Fuss and Wavermann, 2005, Becchetti and Adriani, 2005). Given its non-rival and
non-excludable nature, knowledge spills over across space and time through various
channels (trade, patents, people, etc.), yielding productivity gains that are propor-
tional to the technological, geographical, or trade proximity between innovators and
recipients. These externalities can take place at any level of economic activity, i.e.,
among firms, industries, regions and countries (Keller, 2004). Therefore, we need to
plug these effects into the model; without them we would underestimate the final
effects of ICT and R&D on hourly productivity.
Now allow us to briefly recall how we calculate ICT and R&D spillovers within in-
dustrial sectors, domestic and abroad. Following the guidelines put forth in literature
regarding spillovers, the spillover variables are measured, for each industrial sector,
as the weighted sum of other sectors’ ICT capital, where the weights are sector i’s
bilateral intermediate consumption shares (Park 2007, Gholami 2009, Pieri 2018). For
example, we have incorporated trade shares with each individual trade partner in the
construction of the external ICT capital of sector i. In other words, our measure of








ICTj,k j 6= i (1.7)
Where n is the number of sectors, h is the number of countries (i.e. 43 according to
WIOD)4, i iterates through all the intermediate goods j for sector i, Zi,j is the inter-
mediate consumption of sector i from sector j, and Zi is sector i’s total intermediate
consumption. Therefore, Zi,j,k/Zi is the bilateral import share, which in turn weights
sectors j’s domestic and abroad ICT capital. The equation for R&D spillovers is the
same, except for ICTj , which is replaced by R&Dj,h, the consumption of R&D in the
other sectors j and countries h.
Therefore the final estimating equation is:





i,j,t) + β7ICTi,j,t · t+ β8R&Di,j,t · t+ αi,j + εi,j,t
(1.8)
Where R&Dsp is the spillover effect of Research and Development for each sector i,
4As Timmer et al. (2014, 2015) warn, WIOD data is lacking for 9.1% of world commerce, therefore
our spillovers are modestly lower than the real ones, i.e. we would expect them to have a slightly
higher impact than we found in this paper. However, this should not change our findings since
intermediate imports represent on average 21.21% of total intermediate consumption considering all
sectors of all countries in WIOD. Therefore only 1.93%, on average, of intermediate consumption is
excluded by our analysis.
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country j and each year t and ICT sp is the spillover impact of ICT from the other
sectors for the same sector and country, during a specific year.
Our analysis tries to be the widest possible, therefore we do not only consider data for
countries as a whole, but we estimate our outcomes starting from individual industrial
sectors’ data. For each country, in fact, we consider the hourly productivity of several
industrial sectors. Therefore we need comparable data for capital distinguished as
ICT and non-ICT for our 11 countries and for several consecutive years. The main
source of these kinds of data are gathered by EU KLEMS dataset (released 2017, re-
vised in July 2018), which collected integrated tables from 1979 to 2015 for European
countries plus the USA. For each country, EU KLEMS database provides 28 industrial
sectors, therefore we have built up a balanced panel database of (26× 15× 11) 4,620
observations for each variable. EU KLEMS database take capital stocks by industry
and asset type directly from Eurostat to ensure compatibility with official data. In
general, for the countries covered its last release, the Perpetual Inventory Method
(PIM) with a geometric depreciation rate, is the preferred method of the national
statistical offices and it is employed by EU KLEMS5. We also use the SEA (Socio
Economic Accounts) database, provided by Timmer et al. (2015) in WIOD, which
collects data about added value for each industrial sector of each country of each year,
and the hours worked for each commodity, for each country for each year. We use
these two databases to calculate hourly productivity for each industrial sector and the
other independent variables. All variables are considered at constant PPP US millions
(2010). Unfortunately, EU KLEMS database do not provide any information about
the composition of the workforce (female employment, migration, educated workers,
employment of the elderly and the retirees) which could be taken into account near
to total hours of work (Hi,j,t); it neither distinguish public capital from private one.
These data are available, but only for country-scale, while in our regressions we need
data at industrial sector scale, homogenized to EU KLEMS database. Nevertheless,
our regressions are informative, as shown by several studies with similar methods and
variables used already present in the literature (Becchetti and Adriani, 2005; Park,
2007; Gholami er al., 2009; Pieri, 2018).
In WIOD database 6 out of 56 industrial sectors can be summed up and be re-
ferred to as ICT intermediate consumption. Following the approach of Strobel(2016),
we aggregate S9 (Printing and reproduction of recorded media), S17 (Manufacture
of computer, electronic and optical products), S18 (Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment), S38 (Motion picture, video and television program production, sound record-
ing and music publishing activities; programming and broadcasting activities), S39
(Telecommunications), S40 (Computer programming, consultancy and related activ-
ities; information service activities) and we get the total ICT intermediate consump-
tion. By difference, non-ICT intermediate consumption is the residual part of total
intermediate consumption.This will be useful to estimate spillover effects.
We run an initial Pool OLS regression on the database in order to test which re-
5http://www.euklems.net/TCB/2018/Metholology_EUKLEMS_2017_revised.pdf, p.9
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gression model would be the best. The Breusch-Pagan statistical test rejects the
hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is adeguate (p-value = 0) in favor of a Ran-
dom Effects and Fixed Effects model, and the Hausman test rejects that in the null
hypothesis, the Random Effects model is adeguate (p-value = 2.24e-23) in favor of
a Fixed-effects model. Therefore, we report only Fixed Effects models, in the sim-
plest case (equation (2)), with the introduction of R&D (equation 5) and finally, with
spillover effects (equation (7)). Therefore our outcomes are:
Where (1), (2), (3) are three different estimated models: respectively, the equation
(8) without R&D and spillover effects, the equation (8) without spillover effects, and
the complete equation (8). Outcomes are robust in all three equations. All signs of
estimated parameters are consistent with their economic interpretation: ICT, their
spillover and non-ICT intermediate consumptions impact positively on hourly pro-
ductivity; R&D and its spillovers have a positive effect on hourly productivity as
literature has already widely indicated; finally, the interaction between time trend
and ICT and R&D exhibit a positive effect each year, meaning that the impact of
CIT and R&D on productivity has increased over the period, year per year. The out-
comes also suggest that it has been correct to plug the R&D variable into the model
; on the contrary, had this variable not been introduced, its effect would have been
completely absorbed by ICT, overestimating its final effects on productivity. More
interesting is the outcome about hours worked.
Canonical real business cycle (RBC) models predict that labor input increases in re-
sponse to a favorable technology shock, while canonical New Keynesian (NK) models
expect a negative sign of hours worked. Galí and Gambetti (2009) show that the re-
sponse of hours worked to technology shocks has substantially changed over time; for
example, in their paper, they show that in the US economy this relationship was neg-
ative at the beginning of the post-war era and turned positive or reached zero towards
the end. However, in existing literature, much remains unknown about the effect of
working hours on labour productivity (Collewet and Sauermann, 2017). In theory,
there could be four effects, reciprocally opposed. Longer hours per each person who
belongs to labour force (H/L +) combined with a higher employment rate (E/L +)
means the replacement of capital with labour; fewer hours worked (H/L −) associated
with a higher employment rate (E/L +) means that the workforce is more relaxed;
more hours worked (H/L +) combined with a lower employment rate (E/L −), on
the contrary, leads to a higher exploitation of the workforce, i.e. increased worker
fatigue; finally, a decrement in hours worked (H/L −) associated with a decrement in
employment rate (E/L −) leads the workforce to be replaced by capital. We could
summarize these possible scenarios in the following table:
What is the theoretical effect of each one of the four scenarios on productivity growth?
On the one hand, worker fatigue, after a number of hours worked, could decrease
the marginal effect on productivity (Pencavel, 2015). On the other hand, more re-
laxed working times should raise the marginal effect of the workforce on productivity
(Menko, 2013). As for the other two scenarios, classical economic theory based on a
Cobb-Douglas production function in a context of perfect competition, suggests that
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Table 1.1: The impact of R&D and ICT on hourly productivity, dependent variable ρi,j,t
(1) (2) (3)
ln(ICT) 0.0986 0.09498 0.07874
(0.0111)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0131)***
ln(NICT) 0.0816 0.0793 0.0795
(0.02716)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0270)***












C.E. 5.3982 5.1918 4.6954
(0.2126)*** (0.2247)*** (0.2367)***
Observations 4494 4231 4231
R− Squared 0.9496 0.9425 0.9432
Notes: 1. Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
2. Standard errors in parentheses. Hourly productivity coefficients are expressed as output
elasticities. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Full tables are available from the
authors upon request.
3. As for Fixed-Effects models, the estimated Country-Effects (C.E.) coefficients are not reported
for ease of exposition.
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H/L (+) H/L (−)
E/L (+) replacement capital liveliness
E/L (−) fatigue replacement workforce
Table 1.2: Matrix for type of job and level of retribution
workforce and capital can be indifferently exchanged on the productive frontier, i.e.,
the replacement effect on productivity growth should be neutral. However, as we
recalled at the beginning of this section, it is not very realistic to assume perfect com-
petition for this kind of analysis, so the effect of replacing labour/capital is a-priori
theoretically uncertain.
Our data on these 11 OECD developed countries indicate that we currently find
ourselves in the fourth scenario, where the employment rate has decreased over the
last 15 years, with the number of hours worked per person in the workforce L has
followed the same trend. This should lead us to expect the impact of H on pro-
ductivity growth to be neutral. On the contrary, we suggest in this paper that the
number of hours worked has a statistically significant negative effect on productivity.
However, according to our data, H decreases in the major part of productions, i.e.
the average effect of H on productivity is positive. Recalling that we are in the fourth
scenario of table 4, we conclude that workforce replacement (i.e. a decrement i H)
has contributed to raising productivity. These findings are consistent with the most
recent literature; Venturini (2015) and Pieri (2018), among others, estimated that the
contribution of hours worked on productivity is negative and statistical significative,
in all European countries. This paper expands these outcomes to include other in-
dustrialized countries, increasing the number of industrial sectors examined for each
country (28 instead of the 19 used by Pieri (2018)) and updating the estimates to 2014.
Next, we plug the values observed in 2000 and in 2014 for all independent variables
into the estimated models to find the increment in hourly productivity estimated by
the model; then, we re-plug the independent variables of 2014 into the three models,
but keeping ICT, ICTsp, R&D and R&Dsp as they were in the year 2000. In this
way, we can find the percentage of productivity growth due to ICT and R&D. The
following table reports the average influence of ICT and R&D on total productivity
growth for each sector i of each country j between 2000 and 2014.
These outcomes of ICT contribution to productivity growth, recall those found by
Van Ark and Inklaar (2005) for the period 2000-2005. Moreover, they are in line with
the findings of Jorgenson et al. (2008) with respect to the US. Our estimations as
shown in the appendix 2, reveal that, on average, ICT did indeed impact US produc-
tivity growth by 56% (64% summing up R&D contribution).
The table shows that, on average, in the 11 countries analyzed, ICT and R&D have
caused more than 60% of all productivity growth. In addition, the ICTs by them-
selves alone represent 46.43% of global productivity growth even if they represent
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Table 1.3: Impact of Drivers on Productivity growth
Productivity growth (predicted) 17.62%
Components of productivity
growth
ICT Intermediate Consumption 8.18%
R&D Intermediate Consumption 4.45%





ICT Within-Industry spillovers 14.57%
ICT Investments Specific TC 3.50%
R&D Capital 14.93%
R&D Within-Industry spillovers −1.83%
R&D Investments Specific TC 1.40%
No-ICT Intermediate Consumption 13.24%
Workforce Replacement 25.93%
only 2.47% of total Capital employed in each country. Non-ICT, on the other hand,
is responsible for only 13.45% of total productivity growth, even though it represents
97.53% of total capital employed by the economies. In addition, we should underline
the effect of hours worked: an increase of 25.28% in productivity growth is due to
hours worked. Recalling table (4), we are examining a scenario of decreasing hours
worked and diminishing employment rate, therefore H stands for capital replacement;
the lower H is, the higher the replacement effect is. Based on the outcomes of our
estimations in table (3) we conclude that a significant part of productivity growth in
the last 15 years has been reached by replacing workforce with capital. The aim of
this paper is to determine what is driving the trend for H, as we will show in our
analysis in the following section.
Overall, these findings demonstrate that the knowledge economy, i.e. ICT technologies
and R&D capital stock, are the leading sectors responsible for productivity growth in
the first 15 years of the 21st century. We also show the impact of ICT and R&D for
each country between 2000 and 2014 in specific bar histogram plots in the appendix
2. Here, we only show the average contribution of ICT, non-ICT, R&D and hours
worked to productivity growth in our 11 countries, sector by sector:
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Figure 1.11: % Contributions to Productivity Growth, Average on 16 Countries for 56 Sectors
Figure 9 shows the contribution of R&D and ICT on productivity growth for each
one of the 28 sectors analyzed. ICT contribution to productivity is dominant in
almost all sectors. Its influence is higher in the service industry with peaks in
S23-Professional, Scientific, Technical, Administrative and Support Service Activi-
ties (67.87%), S24-Public Administration and Defense; Compulsory Social Security
(61.17%), S27-Health and Social Work (62.64%) and S18- Accommodations and Food
Service Activities (60.84%) while it is lower in the manufacturing industry with peaks
in S14-Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (63.17%), S11-Machinery and Equipment
(52.93%) S15-Construction (51.15%). On the other hand, while the effect of replacing
workforce with capital is particularly strong in the manufacturing sector, it has also
started to affect many sectors of the service industry such as S25-Public Administra-
tion and Defense (20.08%), S19-Telecommunications (48.78%), S18-Accommodations
and Food Service Activities (11.91%).
The same bar histograms in reference to single countries (found in Appendix 2) con-
firm the findings reported in recent literature but also add a great deal of new and
more detailed data. In countries like Germany, the UK and the USA, ICT was re-
sponsible for more than 50% of total productivity growth; this was most evident in
Germany where in practically every sector, almost all productivity growth was due to
ICT (51.05%) or workforce replacement (26.69%). On the other hand, Italy and Spain
have seen a lower ICT impact on total productivity growth (around 50%). Italy is
something of an outlier: ICT had quite a weak effect on productivity growth (14.87%)
while non-ICT capital has proved to have a far stronger effect (25.47%), together with
workforce replacement (33.33%). Overall, in all the countries surveyed, workforce re-
placement concerned mainly manufacturing sectors (S3-S15) with H contributing an
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average of 42.97% towards total productivity growth. However, what is more inter-
esting, this trend also affected service industries (S16-S28). For these sectors, 8.68%
of total productivity growth, on average, was due to workforce replacement.
At this point, we have proven two stylized facts regarding our 16 OECD countries:
on the one hand LDR rate has hugely increased in each one of our countries over the
last 30 years; on the other hand productivity growth has been proven to be mainly
led by ICT technologies. Now we want to show the strength in the link between the
movements in LDR and in hourly productivity. If LDR had been influenced by hourly
productivity trends, we would have been indirectly able to calculate the impact of ICT
on workforce and its sign, which is the main focus of this paper.
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1.4 Productivity Growth Impact on LDR
In this Section we test our main hypothesis that productivity growth in the last
25 years, lead mainly by ICT technologies, as just shown, is causing a progressive
reduction of human labor. The dependent variable is the Labor Devaluation Rate
(LDR). The main independent variable studied in the following model, is a proxy for
technological innovation (hourly productivity). Controlling for other variables that
take into account for structural elements in the job market of each country, we test if
the huge increment in LDR could be in part related to the lasting ICT innovations.
Regressing LDR on hourly productivity has the economic sense of studying how pro-
ductivity gains have affected the structure of the workforce (and whether they have
been affected in any way). Together with hourly productivity, other control vari-
ables for institutional characteristics of job market must be added. Our first three
controls are ’trade union density’, ’collective bargaining coverage’ and ’employment
protection legislation’ which cover the most important characteristics of the wage
bargaining system, as per Young et al. (2017). In particular, as for "employment pro-
tection legislation" we use the EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) database
provided by OECD. This independent variable is crucial since it controls for that
part of temporary wage contracts growth due to structural reforms beyond ICT. So
that, if a country has relaxed its EPL through institutional reforms over the time
series considered, we expect to observe an increase in the rate of temporary contracts
(Dolado et al., 2002; Alesina et al., 2008) that, in turn, affects the LDR. Plugging
the EPL index in our panel estimations, we are sure to separate the ICT innovation
effects on LDR from the institutional reforms of the job market.
Furthermore, we control for the impact of unemployment benefit schemes which
should affect incentives to apply for a job: higher benefits reduce incentive to ac-
cept a new job (Benham, 1983) and this, in turn, raises unemployment (Filges et a.,
2015). Moreover, GDP, according to Okun’s law and as emphasised by Sarkar (2013)
and by Bayrak and Tatli (2018), negatively affects unemployment: when GDP grows,
unemployment is in fact expected to drop and vice versa. Finally, I control for the
inflation rate which we use as a proxy for the monetary policy effects on employment.
A Panel Dataset was built from 1995 to 2016, which included 16 industrialized OECD
countries, for a total of 352 observations for each variable. We excluded some coun-
tries because of limited data availability from OECD. The model used to determine
the factors affecting LDR is a logistic regression model. This model works well for
limited response in to the dependent variable; in this case LDR is a value between 0
and 1. Moreover, a logistic model fits well for describing demographic transitions over
time, and jobs robotization recall just to a structural change in the employed popula-
tion (a progressive loss of jobs, captured by LDR). The application of this model for







= ldri,t = f(ρi,t;Xi,t) (1.9)
Where f(·) is a linear combination of hourly productivity (ρ) and other control vari-
ables (Xit). By appropriately manipulating the equation, we can obtain a new alge-
braic formulation that allows us to estimate the model with a simple linear regression.
Next, we explicate control variables and find the estimating equation:
ui,t = β1ρi,t + β2TU i,t + β3C i,t + β4ln(Sb)i,t + β5πi,t + β6ln(GDP )
+ β7Pi,t + αi + γ1 + ...+ γ21 + εi,t
(1.10)
Where αi is the country-specific fixed effect while γi are the 21 dummy variables
for time-specific fixed effects; ρi,t is the hourly productivity of country i in the year
t; TU is the rate of trade-unionization of the working class; C is the percentage of
workers covered by a collective national contract; Sb the logarithm of unemployment
subsides paid by the government; πi,t is the inflation rate; GDP is the logarithm of
Gross Domestic Product and P is the degree to which job are protected from dismissal.
Breusch-Pagan statistical test rejects the hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is ad-
equate, favoring instead the Random effects model. Therefore, we compare a Within
OLS Trasformation model (WH), a First Difference OLS model (FD), a Random
Effects (RE) model and a Fixed Effects (FE) model. As LDR is not random but
deterministically associated with certain historical, political, geographical and other
facts, as Egger (2000) pointed out, we prefer the FE model, since it accounts for
country-specific fixed effects. Indeed, in WH and FD transformation models there
is no intercept by construction while in RE models the intercept is assumed to be
identical for all countries, i.e. with no country-specific fixed effects. In addition, the
FE model fits better than the RE, also because the Hausman (1978) test reveals that
there is correlation between the random effects errors and the explanatory variables
(p-value 1.6559e-16). Finally, we checked that there are no problems of endogeneity
among regressors of equation (10) in FE, WH and FD models6. Estimation of all mod-
els are run by using robust standard errors for clusters. Finally, we also run a fixed
effects-2SLS (FE-2SLS) model, where we instrument the productivity with the equa-
tion (8) used in the previous section. In this section, as for FE-2SLS, we gather data
for equation (8) at country level in order to homogenize them to the other variables of
(10)7. We show the outcomes of estimates both for the case of classical unemployed
index, provided by OECD, and for what we call LDR, as dependent variables.
The outcomes of the estimates are as the following:
6The correlation between the error term and each one of regressors for the three models (FE,
WH, FD), is always very close to 0. We show the correlation matrix Regressors-Estimation Errors
of only FE model in Appendix 3. FE model is, indeed, the ones which fits better our data.
7Unfortunately data on ICT and non-ICT capital stock are not available for Belgium, Portugal
and Canada.
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Table 1.4: Panel Model: HAC (Robust SE), dependent variable ldri,t
Within FD RE FE FE-2SLS
Const − − −2.7143 7.6584 15.1864
(5.049) (4.9824) (4.7201)***
Productivity 0.0292 0.0167 0.0148 0.0365 0.0666
(0.0061)*** (0.0104) (0.0032)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0097)***
Inflation −0.0568 −0.0129 −0.0540 −0.0462 −0.0190
(0.0124)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0115)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0113)
lnSubsides 0.0763 0.0542 0.2008 0.2055 0.1096
(0.0566) (0.0138)*** (0.0787)** (0.0667)*** (0.0433)**
EPL −0.3895 −0.1482 −0.3361 −0.3920 −0.2682
(0.0807)*** (0.0403)*** (0.0865)*** (0.0590)*** (0.2233)
lnGDP −0.5646 −1.0628 0.0037 −0.8394 −1.5459
(0.4564) (0.5971)* (0.3182) (0.3680)** (0.3821)***
Trade-union 0.0058 0.0008 0.0006 0.0019 0.0083
(0.0084) (0.0119) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0113)
Coverage −0.0014 −0.0025 −0.0014 −0.0031 0.0026
(0.0039) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0039)
F(6, 15) 4.02e-9*** 1.66e-07*** 8,51e-72*** 3.92e-10*** 3.29e-06***
Observations 352 336 352 352 263
R− Squared 0.4708 0.1794 0.9013 0.9275
*Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
**Dummies for FE time specific effects are not significative, therefore We re-estimated eq.(2) removing them
***For the F-test on regressors are shown p-values
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Table 1.5: Panel Model: dependent variable ui,t
Within FD RE FE FE-2SLS
Const − − −1.6646 13.5329 23.1032
(3.9224) (5.0816)*** (3.9962)***
Productivity 0.0288 0.0331 0.0049 0.0349 0.0706
(0.0061)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0033) (0.0080)*** (0.0116)***
Inflation −0.0732 −0.0248 −0.0654 −0.0613 −0.04139
(0.0151)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0158)**
lnSubsides 0.1137 0.0827 0.2673 0.2769 0.1468
(0.0816) (0.0292)** (0.1096)*** (0.1038)** (0.0763)*
EPL −0.4029 −0.1281 −0.3874 −0.4061 −0.2654
(0.1124)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0977)*** (0.1037)*** (0.2475)
lnGDP −1.1610 −2.9163 −0.1397 −1.3834 −2.2461
(0.3542)*** (0.4791)*** (0.2323) (0.3645)*** (0.3428)***
Trade-union 0.0117 0.0021 0.0041 0.0071 0.0111
(0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0063) (0.0104) (0.0083)
Coverage −0.0021 −0.0016 −0.0023 −0.0038 0.0034
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0044)
F(6, 15) 6.53e-8*** 1.66e-07*** 8,51e-72*** 3.92e-10*** 5.30e-07***
Observations 352 336 352 352 263
R− Squared 0.4472 0.465 0.8609 0.8930
*Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
**Dummies for FE time specific effects are not significative, therefore We re-estimated eq.(2) removing them
***For the F-test on regressors are shown p-values
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The control variables of the panel confirm some empirical evidence already under-
lined by literature: the known inverse relationship between inflation and employment
is respected; a higher level of unemployment benefits has a positive impact on the
total LDR level, as it discourages people from seeking employment; the higher the
protections from dismissal are, the lower the LDR is, simply because is more diffi-
cult to fire workers. Finally, the other two control variables (trade-unionization and
percentage of workers covered by a national collective agreement) do not appear to
be statistically significant (i.e. their effect has already been captured by trade union
and coverage control variables) in any model. More interesting is the outcome in our
interest variable: data found in this panel gives us an answer to our initial question.
The productivity growth of the entire occupied population has impacted the LDR,
and this impact has been positive.
The FE model reveals, with a significance of over 99%, that technical innovation
from 1995 to 2016 contributed positively to explaining the trend (generally increas-
ing) of that segment of the labor force which does not have permanent full-time
employment. The reduction in the bargaining power of workers, the state subsidies
paid to the unemployed, the GDP trend and the known inflation levels during the
period are not sufficient to explain the increase in LDR workers. If the new generation
of technologies had created more work than they destroyed, the sign of productivity
should have been negative; if the innovation process had had a neutral effect on LDR,
its regressor parameter should have been statistically not-significant, but data reveal
this is not the case.
These findings are also true for the classical unemployment measurement but with
a different impacts of the independent variables. Indeed, the productivity growth
(mainly lead by ICT, as seen in the previous section), stronger affects LDR (0.0365)
than unemployment (0.349); this is consistency to McKinsey (2015) hypothesis that
digital technologies replace jobs only gradually, changing, over the middle-term, the
structure and the quality of employment (more flexible jobs, part-time and atypi-
cal contracts). Moreover, inflation comes out to negatively impact unemployment
approximately by 50% stronger than LDR, that is less sensitive to price variations
(-0.0462 instead of -0.0613). The same holds for all the other independent variables;
unemployment subsides and GDP seems to affect LDR with lower parameters than
for unemployment. Overall, the labour force without a permanent full-time job (i.e.
LDR) is more sensitive to ICT innovation than the simple unemployed workforce,
while it is less strongly affected by the other classical control variables. Only for the
independent variable that captures the institutional protection of jobs it is found a
parameter quite identical.
According to Schumpeter, technical innovations are supposed to occur in swarms, de-
stroying existing monopoly profits which are merely the precondition for technological
competition. The industrial growth process is composed of a series of endogenously
caused continuous and discontinuous of deviations from a hitherto existing equilib-
rium and the overshooting and gradual adjustment to a new temporary equilibrium
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(Rahmeyer, 1989). The extent of technical knowledge is largely endogenously de-
termined by the amount of profit-motivated R&D expenses, as our estimations take
into account. The sources of new technical knowledge are both scientific inventions
and accumulated practical past experience in construction and development (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 2010). The evolutionary theory of innovation is
the theory of economics of innovations which, starting with Shumpeter, tells us that
through creative destruction, capitalism is a process in constant motion which contin-
ually creates and destroys new markets. This could be the case of the more traditional
markets that have been replacing from the 90s by the new high-tech firms, charac-
terized by a very strong automation. While the first generation of Web businesses
(Web 1.0) were largely focused on delivering firm-developed, closed products and ser-
vices top-down through a centrally managed server to customers, Web 2.0 businesses
are completely new markets, in substitution of the previous ones. Typical business
examples include online community review and rating (Amazon, Netflix), social book-
marking (Del.icio.us, Furl), online social networking (MySpace, Facebook), blogging
(Blogspot), wikis (Wikipedia, HowTo), peer-to-peer file and content sharing (Nap-
ster, YouTube, Flickr, Slashdot), mashup (Google Maps), music remix (ccMixter),
interactive recommendation systems (Pandora), mobile applications on smartphones
(Shazam on Apple’s iPhone and RIM’s Blackberry), massively multiplayer online
games (Half-Life, World of Warcraft) and virtual worlds (Second Life). These new
sectors are replacing entire traditional markets, deleting thousands of jobs (Arakji
and Lang, 2010), consistently to our empirical findings. We could be in front of a
great technological transition.
1.5 Long-Run LDR Forecast
Are medium-long term forecasts possible? Of course, in the long run all the economic
variables may change and therefore it is very difficult to venture forecasts. However,
different scenarios can be constructed according to the initial assumptions. The num-
ber of LDR workers has increased significantly over the last 25 years, and, as we have
found through empirical analysis, the growth in hourly productivity has been one of
its main driving factors. An interesting simulation could be to study what would
happen if hourly productivity continued to increase at a certain stable rate, while the
other control variables remained unchanged. The idea behind this type of simulation
would be to see what impact technological development would have on the LDR level
if the social variables (for which model controls) remained constant. If the State re-
frains from any further monetary and fiscal policy intervention, if it always pays the
same unemployment benefits, if the legislation protecting workers no longer changes
and if the unionization rate does not change, the model suggests that the share of
LDR workers would increase anyway, if hourly productivity increased.
What is the reasonable expectation regarding how the share of LDR workers would
move over time? The hypothesis is that, other conditions being equal, the increase
in hourly productivity should affect the number of LDR workers through a logistic
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curve. In literature, in fact, it has been amply demonstrated that the development
of leading technologies takes place through the logistic curve. The first economist to
have this insight, although indirectly, was Schumpeter, who distinguished the main
invention emerging in a given period from the cluster of other discoveries linked to
it. The vintage invention, which Gavin Wright defines as GPTs (General Purpose
Technologies), is a disruptive technology in that it disrupts the productive paradigms
of the past, is transversal to all sectors, and can be developed in many new applica-
tions (the bunches). As they develop, GPTs first exhibit an exponential-like explosive
effect, but subsequently, they gradually exhaust their innovative potential because
they have been fully developed. When the last GPT has been fully developed, the
productivity of the economic system stagnates, and it does not recover until the dis-
covery of a new GPT.
Now, the latest GPT still in progress (internet), as empirically shown, is destroy-
ing, for the first time in the history of industrial revolutions, more hours of work
than it creates and consequently, the share of LDR workers is increasing. As GPTs
develop historically according to a logistic curve and as the share of LDR workers is
guided by the implementation and development of this latest GPT, we could reason-
ably expect that the entire evolution of LDR workers over time has been following
a logistic trend. The other control variables should not cause any kind of long-term
trend on the share of LDR workers, because they are social variables. They depend
therefore on the type of interaction between agents, which in turn depends on the
free individual choices which by definition cannot be schematized in a deterministic
model. In fact, we could have a historical phase in which workers are stronger and
organized, followed by another one where entrepreneurs acquire greater influence; by
this example, we would first observe a reduction in the share of LDR workers, and
in a second phase an increment. Precisely for this reason it would not make sense to
presuppose an a priori trend of these variables. The technological evolution, on the
other hand, is different since it is much more deterministic: the logistic curve used to
describe the development of GPT inventions reflects a process independent of human
will, according to which a great technological discovery increases the knowledge of
man and the greater knowledge in turn leads to new discoveries until all the fields of
the new GPT have been explored and it is not possible to develop it further.
Our Fixed Effects model in (2) is already a logistic equation (remember that this
specification was necessary because dependent variable LDR is between 0-1). There-
fore, entering the parameters estimated together with regressors values available in
the last year (2016), we are able to forecast certain scenarios. In these simulations,
as explained above, we keep the social variables constant and equal to their value
in 2016. On the contrary, we try to increase the hourly productivity according to








Where r is the rate of productivity growth, t = 1 is the calendar year 2017, β is a
row vector of the estimated parameters in table 6 (FE) and X is the column vector
of control variables. The outcomes are reported in the table, each country observed
recorded separately. We have proposed 5 different scenarios: the first assumes that
productivity grows at a constant annual rate equal to the average recorded over the
previous 22 years (from 1995 to 2016), which is different for each country; the other
scenarios, instead, assume growth to take place at progressively increasing rates from
2% per year to 5%. We have chosen to forecast the year when a country will reach a
LDR threshold of 60%. Indeed, this is the same percentage used by McKinsey (2015)
and Vardi (2015); therefore, we will be able to compare my findings with theirs.
The outcomes in Table 6 are impressive. The share of people, out of the total work-
Table 1.6: Year when 60% labour force will be without a permanent full-time employment, accord-
ing to different yearly productivity rates of growth.
Average
(last 5 years)
2% 3% 4% 5%
Austria 2038 2061 2046 2039 2034
Belgium 2042 2058 2044 2037 2033
Canada 2051 2067 2050 2041 2036
Denmark 2037 2059 2045 2038 2033
Finland 2038 2060 2045 2038 2034
France 2033 2047 2037 2031 2028
Germany 2037 2052 2040 2034 2030
Greece 2040 2056 2043 2036 2032
Italy 2042 2051 2040 2034 2030
Japan 2050 2071 2053 2044 2038
Luxemburg 2029 2044 2035 2030 2027
(The) Nederlands 2039 2055 2042 2036 2032
Portugal 2034 2052 2040 2034 2030
Spain 2031 2038 2031 2027 2025
United Kingdom 2048 2070 2052 2043 2038
USA 2045 2068 2051 2042 2037
force, who will be unemployed, temporary workers, or forced to work part-time or in
mini-jobs, will exceed 60% of the total already between 2040 and 2050 in most of the
countries analyzed, under the assumption that the average growth rate of hourly pro-
ductivity will be 3%. If hourly productivity rises by the same average rate recorded
from 1995 to 2016, practically all countries will reach the 60% threshold between 2030
and 2040. These results are in line with those of Vardi (2015) and McKinsey (2015).
Moreover, if productivity gains were to rise 4% per year, almost all countries would
reach the above limit before 2040. Some countries reach the target before others be-
cause they start from very different levels of LDR workers: for example, Spain already
had 47.27% of workers in those categories in 2016, Italy 35.26% and Portugal 37.40%
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and therefore will reach 60% much sooner. On the contrary, countries like England or
Japan start at much lower levels, at 13.69% and 14.25% respectively, so they will take
more years, on average, to reach the threshold of 60%. In any case, these predictions,
supported by econometric estimates, suggest that in the next two or three decades
the labor force could be completely transformed by the fourth industrial revolution.
These results do not appear to be robust mainly because the LDR starting level is
very different country by country; moreover, these outcomes are very sensitive to the
productivity growth rate. As suggested by the estimates, even a small but persistent
difference in the rate of productivity growth lead to very different outcomes on the
long-run. However, the estimation model is proofed to be robust, as shown in the
Appendix 3, therefore the great differences in the forecasts are mainly due to the hy-
pothesis on the productivity growth and to the beginning LDR level. As conclusions,
the scenarios drawn by these forecasts should be interpreted with caution, even if




This paper first tested the empirical evidence, in 16 OECD countries, of growing
unemployment and a radical change in work structure over a long period of time.
From a situation where 90% of the workforce was employed in full-time employment
(during the 1980s), we have moved to a situation where nowadays between 25-35%
of the workforce is either unemployed, or has a temporary, short-time, involuntary
part-time job.
The reasons for this structural change in labour in industrialized countries are not
only social (trade-unions, unemployment benefits, legal protection of the workplace,
etc.), but also technological. However, the development of technology in the last
two decades has been incontrovertibly driven by ICT. Therefore, for the first time
since the first industrial revolution, technical progress, on average, is creating fewer
jobs than it is destroying. This statement has been validated by empirical analysis.
Moreover, the paper estimates LDR movement with a logistic curve. The fact that
outcomes are robust and statistically significative, reinforces the hypothesis that the
LDR trend is propelled by ICT, since literature has already shown that technological
development over the long-term is logistical. This outcome has allowed us to forecast
future LDR values. By 2040, according to our estimates, in most OECD countries
observed, LDR will be approximately 60% of workforce.
Since we are probably only at the beginning of this process, this trend may not yet
seem particularly evident, but the statistical estimates reveal that we could already
have embarked on a logistical path. This logistic curve, indeed, grows very slowly at
the beginning, but then it explodes. In 30 years, the time series on employment could
indicate a bell curve trend over the period between 1970 and 2040. The Nobel Prize
winning economist Wassily Leontief agreed, stating definitively in 1983 that ”the role
of humans as the most important factor of production is bound to diminish in the
same way that the role of horses in agricultural production was first diminished and
then eliminated by the introduction of tractors”. In what became known as the ’great
decoupling’, the demand for human workers fell as businesses were able to output
more goods and services at cheaper rates using machines (Rotman, 2013).
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1.8 Appendix 1
In this appendix we would test the direction of causality in our main estimations.
We computes the Granger causality test for panel data put forward by Dumitrescu
and Hurlin (2012). In the test, all the coefficients are allowed to vary across cross-
sections in the panel. The test is computed by running standard Granger causality
regressions for each cross-section, taking the average of the test statistics (W-bar) and
standardizing it (Z-bar). Z-bar follows a standard normal distribution.The number of
lags in the Granger causality regression, K, and the number of time-periods in each
cross-sectional unit i, Ti, must satisfy the following condition:
Ti > 5 + 2K
Firstly, we run the Dumitrescu-Hurlin test (2012) on ICT-productivity database that
counts for 308 cross-sections and 15 time-periods. Because of the short length of
time-periods we prefer to run the panel causality test only for 1 Lag.
In this Table, we found that there is a bidirectional-causality between ICT and
hourly productivity. It is interesting since it means not only that productivity growth
is associated to ICT capital, but also that an increase in productivity causes in turn
a raise in ICT capital employed by firms. Is ICT both a cause and a consequence of
economic growth? The pioneering work of Cronin et al. (1991) found bidirectional
causality between telecommunication investment and GDP in the US, using data for
the 1958-1988 period. The second cusality-direction, (rho → ICT) although studied
relatively infrequently, is also important because it concerns how productivity growth
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Table 1.7: Granger Causality Test for panel data: ICT-Productivity
Null Hypothesis W-bar Z-bar p-value
ln(ICT) 9 ln(ρ) 3.2410 17.7346 0.0000***
ln(ρ) 9 ln(ICT) 3.7459 22.1226 0.0000***
ICT 9 ρ 3.2528 17.8379 0.0000***
ρ 9 ICT 3.6217 21.0430 0.0000***
can generate the resources to invest in ICT technologies and to serve additional ICT-
related demand created by rising income. Intuitively, a feedback loop (or bidirectional
causality) may be expected, especially in economies of less affluent countries which
rely on the advent and acceptance of new and disruptive technologies for economic
growth (Banerjee et al. 2020).
Secondly, referring to the LDR panel estimations (Table 1.4), we have a database
with 22 time-periods and 16 countries; because of the small length of the time series
we prefer to set 1 Lag.
Table 1.8: Granger Causality Test for panel data: LDR-Productivity
Null Hypothesis W-bar Z-bar p-value
ldr 9 ln(ρ) 3.0386 4.4378 0.0000***
ln(ρ) 9 ldr 1.2775 0.3692 0.7120
LDR 9 ρ 2.9030 4.1246 0.0000***
ρ 9 LDR 1.1060 -0.0268 0.9786
This second table found a direct association between LDR and hourly productivity
growth. The causation is unidirectional; is the raise of productivity that has caused an
increase in the level of unemployment and other not full-time permanent jobs. Taking
together the outcomes of these last two table withe the sign of estimated parameters
in the equations (1.8) and (1.10), we can conclude that an increment in ICT capital
causes a raise in the hourly productivity that in turn stimulate the demand for ICT
capital; productivity growth, in turn, causes LDR increase. Therefore, we can state
that an increment of ICT capital is reducing full-time permanent jobs: ICT↑ → ρ ↑
→ LDR↑.
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1.10 Appendix 3: Robust Check
As a robustness check, we work only on the FE estimation which is the reference
model of this paper; indeed, as we stated in the Section 4, it is the one which fits
best.
Firstly, we removed each independent variable from the model, one at a time,
and we tested for this omission. In particular, we are interested in testing hourly
productivity as an independent variable; according to the hypotheses of this paper,
its omission should reduce the goodness of fit of the model and the test should state
that it is wrong to omit it.
The following table shows that the independent variables for the percentage of work-
ers covered by a national collective agreement (Coverage) and the trade-unionization
(Trade-union) of the labour force, could be omitted improving the goodness of fit of
the model, just as suggested by the outcomes of table 3. The other variables, on the
other hand, should not be removed, according to the test. Therefore, this is a further
confirmation of the fact that hourly productivity affects LDR rate; indeed, if it is
removed from the model, the goodness of fit of the model worsens.
Now, we run a second check for the robustness, dropping one country at a time.
By this way, we verify if there are countries which heavily affects the final outcome of
our estimation by themselves. The following estimations are always run with robust
standard errors. Table 5 shows that our outcomes are robust with respect to the
exclusion of individual countries from our sample. The independent variable that
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Productivity 4.44e-06*** −111.528 −77.702 −26.528
Inflation 0.0132** −265.456 −231.630 −180.456
Empl.subs 0.0007*** −227.813 −193.987 −142.813
Protection 1.41e-05*** −221.811 −187.986 −136.811
GDP 0.0032*** −219.529 −185.704 −134.530
Trade-union 0.5673 −275.881 −242.055 −190.881
Coverage 0.9892 −276.943 −243.118 −191.944
FE model − −274.945 −239.581 −186.081
*Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
**P-value refers to omitted variable test. Null Hypothesis: omitted variable parameter is zero
accounts for productivity is always statistically significative and always positive, i.e.
the productivity trend of the last 22 years has caused, together with other variables,
the upward in LDR index. Moreover, this check shows that by excluding Luxembourg
(which could be considered an outlier country due to its small dimensions and peculiar
economic conditions), the general estimation improves. In the end, our FE panel es-
timation is robust compared to countries (table 5) and to their independent variables
(table 4). Therefore, the economic considerations regarding the results found in table
3 are reinforced by this robust check.
Finally, we report here the correlation matrix of regressors and error terms for the
estimation of equation (1.10).
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Table 1.10: Robust Check 1: Sequential Regressors Omission Test
Omitted-
countries
Productivity Inflation Empl.subs Protection GDP Trade-Union Coverage
USA 0.0192 −0.0290 0.1665 −0.4216 -1.0471 0.0035 6.22e-05
(0.0028)*** (0.0104)** (0.0462)*** (0.0687)*** (0.3294)*** (0.0061) (0.0030)
UK 0.0193 −0.0313 0.1552 −0.4142 −1.040 0.0040 0.0004
(0.0028)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0396)*** (0.066)*** (0.3166)*** (0.0061) (0.0031)
Japan 0.0194 −0.0229 0.1691 −0.4426 −1.0460 0.0054 6.12e-05
(0.0029)*** (0.0092)** (0.044)*** (0.06768)*** (0.3036)*** (0.0057) (0.0031)
Canada 0.0198 −0.0283 0.1627 −0.4209 −1.1108 0.0036 0.0003
(0.0028)*** (0.010)** (0.0390)*** (0.0673)*** (0.3300)*** (0.0060) (0.0029)
Belgium 0.0201 −0.0291 0.1631 −0.4074 -1.0501 0.0048 0.0003
(0.0028)*** (0.0099)** (0.0037)*** (0.0623)*** (0.3220)*** (0.0060) (0.0031)
Germany 0.0210 −0.0286 0.1452 −0.3889 -1.1452 0.0017 −0.0009
(0.0027)*** (0.0099)** (0.1452)*** (0.0603)*** (0.3130)*** (0.0068) (0.0027)
Luxemburg 0.0179 −0.0348 0.1266 −0.4378 −1.141 0.0022 0.0004
(0.0042)*** (0.0092)*** (0.0310)*** (0.081)*** (0.3134)*** (0.0072) (0.0029)
(The) Ned-
erlands
0.0181 −0.0233 0.1780 −0.4370 −1.008 0.0062 0.0015
(0.0026)*** (0.0095)** (0.0463)*** (0.0551)** (0.2929)*** (0.0050) (0.0027)
Austria 0.0198 −0.0283 0.1718 −0.3965 −1.1372 0.0006 9.55e-05
(0.0028)*** (0.0103)** (0.0366)*** (0.1007)*** (0.3576)*** (0.01588) (0.0029)
Denmark 0.020 −0.0278 0.1825 −0.4065 −1.1166 0.0023 4.57e-05
(0.0035)*** (0.0105)** (0.0658)** (0.0076)*** (0.3621)*** (0.0071) (0.0030)
Greece 0.0189 −0.0223 0.1675 −0.4039 −0.9414 0.0026 0.0054
(0.0028)*** (0.0123)* (0.0406)*** (0.0622)*** (0.3413)** (0.0067) (0.0042)
Spain 0.0175 −0.0275 0.1680 −0.4102 −0.8119 0.0056 −0.0022
(0.0026)*** (0.011)** (0.0429)*** (0.0543)*** (0.2708)*** (0.0061) (0.024)
France 0.020 −0.0283 0.1617 −0.4155 −1.051 0.0045 0.0006
(0.0029)*** (0.010)** (0.0366)*** (0.0658)*** (0.3128)*** (0.0060) (0.0032)
Italy 0.01931 −0.0266 0.1618 −0.4227 −1.0544 0.0034 8.29e-05
(0.0030)*** (0.011)** (0.0399)*** (0.0068)*** (0.3136)*** (0.0062) (0.0031)
Portugal 0.020 −0.0268 0.1583 −0.5547 −1.1857 0.0031 0.0010
(0.0025)*** (0.0116)** (0.0387)*** (0.1654)*** (0.2618)*** (0.0074) (0.0037)
Finland 0.0189 −0.0235 0.1581 −0.4525 −0.9856 −0.0011 0.0005
(0.0031)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0901)*** (0.3525)** (0.0059) (0.0035)
*Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%, 330 observations
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The first figure shows the correlation matrix in the case of equation (1.10). As it is
possible to observe, there is zero correlation, ie.e no endogeneity, between the residuals
of our estimations (FE-model) and the other regressors. However, there is high corre-
lation between GPD and trande-union and between the percentage of workers covered
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by collective national contracts and the protection of job from fire. Protection and
Trade-union are not statistical significative according to our estimation, therefore, we
can easily take them out from the model and re-estimate it. We get strongly statistical
significative estimations for all the other regressors, and now, finally, the correlation
matrix has everywhere low values, especially the correlation between residuals and
regressors, that is always 0.
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Chapter 2
Middle Class Thinning and the
Rise of Populism
2.1 Introduction
Technological progress in ICTs has decreased the demand for medium-skilled labor,
while the demand for both low- and highly-skilled labor has risen. Economists, in-
cluding Autor et. al (1997), Levy and Murnane (2012), Acemoglu and Autor (2010),
and many others, have documented this trend in a number of accurate studies (Autor
et al., 1997; Autor et al., 2006; Autor and Dorn 2010; Autor and Dorn 2013). Their
findings in the literature seem to show that the well-known phenomenon of skill-biased
technical change, usually associated with innovation, is not working as traditionally
expected with ICTs. By definition, skill-biased technical change favors people with
more human capital by requiring more educated workers to be hired and reducing the
demand for less-skilled workers. On the contrary, the innovations which have been
developing in the fourth industrial revolution seem to affect the labour market in two
ways. The demand for certain skilled jobs has increased while the demand for other
kinds of skilled jobs has seen a reduction. Conversely, while the demand for some
low-skilled jobs rose, the demand for others dropped. To explain these distinctions,
we reference the work of Acemoglu and Autor (2010) who have suggested that jobs
can be divided into a two-by-two matrix: cognitive (highly skilled) versus manual
(low-skilled) and routine or non-routine.
These two economists found that the demand for workers who carry out routine-
task jobs has dropped, regardless of whether such jobs are cognitive (highly-skilled)
or manual (low-skilled). This leads to the polarization of employment between two
types of jobs: non-routine cognitive jobs versus non-routine manual jobs. The fall in
the demand for workers in routine manual professions entails a further reduction in
the wages of this sector, which was already the least remunerated of the four cate-
gories. Conversely, the reduction in demand for workers doing cognitive but routine
jobs has been associated with a wage enhancement. Usually, an increment in the
workforce supply lowers the pay; therefore, why have wages for cognitive non-routine
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professions increased? This can only be explained by assuming that the demand
for highly-skilled workers has increased more than proportionally with respect to the
supply. On the other hand, even though the demand for low-skilled workers has in-
creased in comparison to medium-skilled ones (Autor and David, 2010), wages have
diminished (Autor et al. 2008). This is possible only if the supply of low-skilled jobs
has increased proportionally, i.e. there have been more medium-skilled workers who
lost their jobs compared to the number of the new low-skilled workers demanded by
enterprises.
On the one hand, there is an increase in the demand for workers doing non-routine
cognitive jobs, which involves an increase in remuneration for those positions which
were already the most remunerative ones even before the ICT revolution; on the
other hand, there is a further impoverishment of the populations employed in occu-
pations that have always been the least remunerative. Finally, there is an increased
impoverishment of an important part of the middle class, forced to fall back on less
remunerative jobs or remain unemployed. This could explain the link between the
development of new ICTs and the increase in inequality. Recent empirical studies
have shown how this ’job polarization’ has been happening in the US (Juhn 1994,
1999; Acemoglu 1999; Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006, 2008; Lemieux 2008; Autor
and Dorn 2010; Acemoglu and Autor 2010), UK (Goos and Manning 2007), West-
Germany (Spitz-Oener 2006; Dustmann et al. 2009) and across European countries
(Goos et al. 2009; Michaels et al. 2014).
Recalling the work of Acemoglu and Autor (2010), Jaimovich and Siu (2014) have dis-
covered a correlation between the polarization of work and the speed of the recovery of
employment rates after the last three recessions. For most of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, after each recession employment usually increased rapidly, but since
the 1990s employment has recovered much more slowly and never completely. When
Jaimovich and Siu compared the 80s, 90s and 2000s, they discovered that the demand
for employees to carry out routine cognitive tasks like cashiers, post office clerks as
well as for routine manual tasks like machine operators, masons and tailors was not
only diminishing, but the rate of its decline was accelerating. These jobs decreased by
5.6% between 1981 and 1991, 6.6% between 1991 and 2001 and 11% between 2001 and
2011. On the contrary, employment in both cognitive non-routine and non-routine
manual jobs grew in all three decades. Many middle and lower-class wage-earners be-
came unemployed after their jobs became obsolete, while a few entrepreneurs enjoyed
most of computerization’s financial benefits. Autor and Dorn (2013) also document a
structural shift in the labour market, with employees reallocating their labour supply
from middle-income manufacturing to low-income service occupations. Arguably, this
is because the manual tasks of service occupations are less susceptible to computer-
ization, as they require a higher degree of flexibility and physical adaptability. In
the words of Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), new technologies began ”encroaching
into human skills in a way that was completely unprecedented”. In summary, the
literature suggests a growing job polarization that is in turn associated with income
inequality growth.
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In this paper we study the evolution of job categories in 16 European countries (those
for which sufficient data are available). As Goos et al. (2009) have done, we firstly
distinguish between routine and non-routine jobs and between skilled and unskilled
jobs. Then, we update their data by checking whether the trend they found in 2009
has reversed or been maintained. Subsequently, using an appropriate classification
of occupations, we also update the Acemoglu and Autor (2010) data relating to the
changes in the percentages of low, medium and high-income occupations, out of the
total number of employed people. The second part of the paper is a literature review
which try to link these outcomes from the job market to the birth of populism. Re-
ferring to the median voter theorem and to the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981),
the general idea is that the progressive modification of job market structure (found
in the empirical part of the paper) is also changing the form of income distribution,
modifying, in turn, the political preferences, as already stated by Frey et al. (2018).
Moreover, we recall the policy-bundle theory by Roemer (2001) and we discuss the
recent literature about the value issue that could have affected the voters together to
economic distributive variables and we found that the social identity both for nation
and income class (Shayo, 2009) are a second source of reasons that, together to mid-
dle class thinning due to job robotization and its consequent polarization, could be
leading to new forms of political participation: the populism.
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2.2 The Estimations
In this section we first update the findings of Goos et al. (2009) in order to determine
the net effect of technological changes in terms of percentage variations among all
types of jobs for 16 European countries. Secondly, following the approach of Ace-
moglu and Autor (2010), we analyze the distributive effect among low, middle and
high-income classes due to the change in the job structure observed in the first part
of this section.
We start from job structure analysis. Our primary source for employment data is the
harmonized individual-level European Union Labor Force Survey (ELFS) for the pe-
riod 1993-2017. The ELFS contains data on employment listed according to economic
activities. There are two datasets available: a more general one and another with more
detailed economic activities. The more detailed dataset contains 2-digit International
Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO) codes while the other contains 1-digit
industry codes from the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Com-
munity (NACE revision 1). Of the 28 countries available in the ELFS, we exclude,
as did Groose et al. (2009), 11 new EU member countries1 and Iceland because of
limited data availability. Data for the remaining 16 European countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway (non-EU), Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom)
are sufficiently complete for a long-term comparative analysis.
From NACE revision 1, we extracted 15 different activities; the others are macro-
categories which contain a mixture of the 15 minimal-activities. In 2008, ELFS
statistics changed, adding 5 economic activities to the previous ones. Fortunately,
each of these 5 items were aggregated into a single category of the original 15 eco-
nomic activities, furthermore, it has been possible to get an homogeneous time series
from 1995 to 2017. Then, we classified the 15 economic activities as routine/non-
routine and skilled/unskilled. In order to distinguish the most highly-skilled jobs, we
used the IOSO-08 classification (from ILO). IOSCO classification divides jobs into
10 major groups and 28 minor groups, and defines the level of skill for each group.
IOSCO defines 4 levels of skill; for this analysis, we considered level 1 and level 2 as
low-skilled jobs, and level 3 and 4 as highly-skilled jobs. In the end, to distinguish
between routine and non-routine economic activities, we used the definition built-up
proposed by Goos et al. (2009). The final outcome is summarized in the following
table.
By the table is possible to observe 4 different jobs, according to the main idea of
Acemoglu and Autor (2010). The first category is made up of non-routine but skilled
jobs (NRS), like professionals, engineers, architects, medical doctors, teachers and
1Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia,
Romania and Bulgaria
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NACE code R NR S NS
Agriulture, foresty, fishing YES YES
Mining and quirryng YES YES
Manufacturing Yes YES
Electricity, gas, water supply YES YES
Construction YES YES
Wholesale and retail trade YES YES
Transportation, storage and communications YES YES
Hotels and restaurants YES YES
Financial and insurance activities YES YES
Real Estate activities YES YES
Public admn. & def.; compulsory social security YES YES
Education YES YES
Human health and social work activities YES YES
Activities of households YES YES
Other service activities YES YES
Table 2.1: Jobs categories, IOSCO and ELFS rielaborations
information and communication technology; the second category is for non-routine,
unskilled jobs (NRNS) like those in hotels and restaurants; the third category is for
routine, skilled (RS) jobs like those in public administration and defense, compul-
sory social security, financial and insurance activities; the last category is for routine,
unskilled jobs (RNS), for example in manufacturing, mining, construction, etc. By
using this classification, we calculated the percentage of each of the 15 ELFS economic
activities out of total current employment, and then we aggregated them into these
four categories of jobs and we calculated the spread between the first and the last
value observed in the time series2. For the convenience of the reader we report in the
Appendix four figures showing the complete time series, for each country, regarding
these four job categories. From these figures, we observe that there exist a consistent
trend for each job category.
2HINC-01. Selected Characteristics of Households by Total Money Income. Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic (ASEC), 2018. Available at:
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-hinc/hinc-01.html
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Figure 2.1: % variations routinely skilled/ not skilled and not routinely skilled/not skilled jobs on
total labour force, 1995-2017, Eurostat.
Typical middle-class jobs are disappearing, while those with very high skills (cogni-
tive) and very low skills (manual) are multiplying. This is due, on the one hand, to
the fact that the most creative tasks that require intellectual speculation, and there-
fore are not currently replicable by artificial intelligence, survive. On the other hand,
as the Moravec paradox states, tasks that require particular sensory-motor skills (for
example the touch of a chef or a nurse) can be very cumbersome from a computa-
tional point of view, and are therefore (for the moment) more easily performed by
humans. The result is what the philosopher Loi (2015) sums up well in his Techno-
logical Unemployment and Human Disenhancement : ”On the one hand, employment
grows for highly specialized managerial, professional and technical jobs; on the other,
it also grows in food preparation and catering, for cleaning and maintenance work, in
personal health care and in numerous occupations in security and protection services.
By comparison, employment for routine forms of work with medium skills has fallen
steadily in relative terms over the past three decades."
It is evident, therefore, that job structure has changed over the past 22 years. What
are the distributive consequences? We investigate whether this new job structure has
increased or reduced income inequality, using the statistics proposed by Acemoglu
and Autor (2010). Instead of classifying jobs by distinguishing them by skill and
routine level, we can sort them by salary level and then aggregate them into three
macro-categories: low-income professions, high-income professions and middle-income
professions. Taking into account, then, the changes in employment between the differ-
ent jobs over a certain period of time, it is possible to study whether the middle-class
occupations have fallen, increased or remained relatively constant.
We start by assuming that the general ranking of jobs according to their pay has
not changed over time, which is a realistic assumption, already adopted by Acemoglu
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and Autor (2010). We use the same data of these authors from their job polarization
analysis, published in the Eurostat ELFS and we consider the same 16 European
countries. The work of Acemoglu and Autor was kept up-to-date until 2006. By
adding the data of the following years as follows, we can update those statistics to
2017.
To classify the professions by remuneration, we use the values referring to the year
2014, the only year available from the ELFS. Job remuneration is expressed in hours,
following the example of Acemoglu and Autor (2010). The value related to agricul-
ture is not available; however, one referring to "Professional, scientific and technical
activities" has been added. To decide the classification order, we take into account
the inter-group variability among the 16 countries. We classify the professions for
each of the countries observed, giving a value of 1 to unpaid jobs and a value of 15
to the most remunerated ones. We then combine the data in the table (8) to sum-
marize the information obtained3. From the table it is possible to obtain a relatively
precise, general classification of professions, valid for all the countries analyzed. The
professions are then aggregated into three macro groups: low, medium and high in-
come. Finally, the employment rates of these three groups are merged and they can
be observed varying for the whole period examined (1995-2017). The following graph
shows the difference in percentages of employment in the three macro-categories that
are grouped by income4.
Figure 2.2: % variations low, middle and high jobs on total labour force, 1995-2017, Eurostat.
The study reveals that in 22 years in almost all European countries analyzed, the
lowest paid professions have grown in terms of occupied jobs, by an average of around
3In the table we have identified the jobs with their corresponding NACE code.
4Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the UK income distribution:





















































































































































































































































































































































4 percentage points with peaks of 7% in the case of Finland. At the same time,
highly paid jobs have also increased in most countries. On the contrary, it is striking
to notice how average-waged jobs have dwindled almost everywhere, with the sole
exception of Norway. A similar trend explains the increased income inequality and
polarization of incomes and the consequent thinning of the ’middle class’, both in
terms of wealth and in number of participants.
All these trends are changing the form of income distribution within industrialized
countries. The study of income distribution has a long history. More than a century
ago, Pareto proposed that income distribution obeys a universal power law, valid for
all time and countries. However, subsequent studies found that this conjecture applies
only to the top 1-3% of the population, therefore, until the end of the 20th century,
it was common to approximate the distribution of income through a Gaussian (Di
Matteo, 2004; Clementi and Gallegati, 2005). More precisely, it has been observed
that the correct distribution pattern is a log-normal with a power law for the right
tail, and it has been proofed to be the universal structure of income (Souma, 2001).
In the two queues of Normal distribution there were few extremely rich or extremely
poor individuals; at the center of the distribution, instead, there was the majority of
the population, and they constituted the "middle class". This is changing: people
with very low, no, or even negative income levels are growing, in the industrialized
countries. As the left tail of the Gaussian became fatter and fatter, the tail on the
far right of the distribution curve also acquired greater depth; the two combined phe-
nomena reduced the central part of the distribution that visibly lost weight making
the Power Law a better fit (Jones, 1997, Banerjee, 2006), coming back to Pareto hy-
pothesis.
An interesting statistic for evaluating the ongoing middle class thinning is to study
the form assumed by the percentages of population by constant income bands (The
Equivalished Disposible Income). These bands are for household, not individuals,
and they refer to the after-tax income. Each income band counts for the number of
subjects who receive income between the two extreme band values. The central band
must contain the average income in the center so that the graph is correct and com-
parable over time and with other countries. If the income were distributed Normally,
the central zone should have the highest population share compared to all the oth-
ers, while the percentage of population in the extreme tails should be similar to one
another and in both cases be lower compared to the central zone. As an example we
show only the cases of USA and UK; in the US the income distribution is better fitted
by a Pareto distribution; as for the UK, the Normal distribution is still the better
fit, however its income distribution is not anymore a Gaussian (statistical Normality
tests fails).
As for the UK, we found official data from the Department of Work and Pensions
which consider 100 income bands; ad for the USA the income bans provided by the
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Figure 2.4: U.S. 2014 Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and
Economic Supplement, Annual Income, Rielaboration.
Looking at England, in 2018, the great imbalance compared to the Normal case is
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remarkable; most people belong to the left tail, far before median income. The av-
erage income is approximately 613£ per week but we calculated that around 65%
of the English population lives below the average income line. It is a distribution
with strong skewedness on the left and as the inequality increases the curve becomes
steeper and more displaced to the left. Similar evidence is found in the US. Normal
distribution does not fit well anymore, even if the Partian distribution is still not
appropriate. In the US the situation is even more radical than in the UK: more than
70% of total households are below the average income level. Compared to UK, the










Normality SSE 0.0009 0.0015
Paretian SSE 0.0371 0.0009
Table 2.3: Equivalished Disposible Income, Main Statistics, Our rielaborations.
1. We reported the p-vale for the four Normality tests. Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
2. SSE is for: Sum Squared Errors
In the Table 2.3 we report some statistics from the population income bands data
used in Figure 2.3-2.4. The skewness is positive, as expected, indicating asymmetry
to the left side of the distributions. UK skewness is lower, suggesting a higher income
inequality in the USA, as noticeable in figure 2.4. We also run four Normality-tests
on both the countries, finding that neither for UK nor for USA, the income distri-
bution among population bands follows a Normal distribution. Finally, the most
important statistic is SSE that we calculated both for Normal and Pareto distribu-
tion. We wanted to compare which of the two distributions fits better to the income
distribution observed; in doing so, we associate the Normal and Pareto distribution
to Uk and USA income distribution and then we calculated the Sum squared Errors
(SSE), excluding the first six observation5. As for UK, the SSE is lower for the case of
Normal distribution. This means that it fits better than Pareto distribution, however
we cannot conclude that the income distribution in UK is Normal, since the Normal-
ity tests refused this hypothesis; we could state that UK is in a period of transition
form an income Normal world to a Pareto one. As regard for USA, on the opposite,
we found that the Pareto distribution is a better shape-estimator than Normal dis-
5The Pareto distribution for the first values is to high; comparing it for all income observations
would have mislead the final outcome.
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tribution (0.0009 vs 0.0015 SSE). We shall hypothesize that the transition which is
involving the UK is going to end in USA.
In front of such a radical change in income distribution, many economists have started
to call this last form of digital capitalism the superstar economy, which is a system
characterized by superstar agents (Rosen, 1981; McKinsey, 2018; Bajgar e al. 2019).
Superstar economies are perhaps better described by a power law, or Pareto curve,
than a Gaussian one. In the power law curve a small number of people reap a dis-
proportionate share of sales. This is often characterized as the 80/20 rule, where 20
percent of the participants get 80 percent of the gains, but it can be more extreme
than that. Kim Taipale, founder of the Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies in Sci-
ence and Technology Policy, has argued that, ”The era of bell curve distributions that
supported a bulging social middle class is over and we are headed for the power-law
distribution of economic opportunities. Education per se is not going to make up the
difference”6. By our findings on the opposite, the Pareto distribution seems to fit well
quite for the whole income distribution (especially in the case of US). Certainly, when
the variance of a Normal distribution goes to infinity and when the power of a Pareto
distribution goes to zero, both the distributions converge in the case of perfect income
equality. However, out of this case, especially if the distribution is getting more and
more unequal, the Pareto distribution seems to fit better, and we found it in the case
of USA. These epochal changes can seriously change the way democracies have always
worked. According to the second assumption of the Median Voter Theorem, indeed,
voters’ preferences need to follow a Normal, bell-shaped distribution, whereby the
majority of voters is located in the middle. This assumption is reasonable for Normal
income distribution where voters are assumed to prefer a more left-wing or right-wing
set of policies depending on their level of income. This leaves the middle classes as the
majority in the middle. However, in a superstar economy dominated by the Power
Law distribution, the median income voter could no longer have preferences close to
the mean income voter, leading to a radicalization of political spectrum. In the next
section we will discuss what is happening to the political preferences, in this new
social context dominated by the ICT revolution.
6Presentation by Kim Taipale at the 21st Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information
Technology, August 1, 2013.
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2.3 A Descriptive Discussion
In the previous section we have just found the ICT revolution has increased the job
polarization entailing a decrease in the relative number of routine middle-income jobs
(Autor, 2015). As a consequence, the share of non-routine jobs at the two ends of the
income distribution is grown and the middle-class has reduced. Graetz and Michaels
(2018), on a larger sample of countries, find that robot adoption has a positive effect
on productivity but a negative impact on the share of hours worked by low-skilled
workers, increasing income inequality. For example, in the US, over the period 1979
to 2013, productivity growth was eight times faster than hourly compensation: as
productivity grew by 64.9 per cent, hourly compensation for 80 per cent of the Amer-
ican workforce grew only by 8.2 per cent, while the top 1 per cent of earners saw
cumulative gains in annual wages of 153.6 per cent (Bivens et al., 2014). A growing
body of work has identified automation as one of the prime forces driving the shifts
in income shares along the occupational wage distribution (Autor et al., 2006; Autor
and Dorn, 2013; Graetz and Michaels, 2015; Michaels et al., 2014; David, 2015), and
from labour and owners of capital (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013). Impressive is
the rapid decline in computing cost compared to the declining share of US employ-
ment in routine jobs shown by Frey et al. (2018). In this context, the median voter
theorem (Downs 1957) could no longer favors the political preferences of the middle
class just because it has been numerically reduced while the share of population un-
der the median income has grown. The famous model by Meltzer and Richard (1981)
states that in the case of right-skewed distribution of income, the position of the most
disadvantaged fringes of the population will prevail over the residual middle-class,
leading, in the hypotheses of their model, to a higher level of taxation/public inter-
vention in economics. Indeed, the 72% of surveyed Americans fear a future in which
computers and robots can do more human jobs, while 85% favor policies to restrict
the use of machines to hazardous jobs (Pew Research Center, 2017). If workers who
have lost out to automation do not accept labour market outcomes, they will resist
the force of technology through non-market mechanisms, such as political activism
(Mokyr, 1990; Mokyr, 1998; Mokyr et al., 2015). Nowadays, this political activism
is called "populism", and its advent could be strongly associated to jobs robotization
and the consequent middle-class thinning and income inequality growth. However, the
distributional effects on the outcome of political elections are controversial in the lit-
erature. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Melzter and Richard (1981) consider that
the median voter is also the median productivity worker in the population. However,
nothing assures us that the median voter in the redistribution of skills is necessarily
the median voter in the distribution of redistributive preferences. The median voter
theorem, indeed, suggests that democracy should be the best system to limit income
inequality because voters could reduce it with each new election but then, why in
the last 30 years, democracies have failed to limit the increases of inequality (Bartels,
2008; Bonica et al., 2013)? Why the most recent response of the electorate has been
populism instead of a classical redistributive policy?
There are two strands of literature that explain how democracies fail to limit in-
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equalities. The asymmetric-participation theory (Benabou, 2000) states that some
groups of voters do not participate in elections and therefore citizens can exert an
unequal influence on political results. This can generate a gap between the hypo-
thetical and the actual median voter, leading to a level of redistribution that is not
the one preferred by the majority of the population. A numerically consistent part
of the electorate does not go to vote. Only in a scenario reflecting the hypothesis
that the electorate which does not vote has the same income distribution as those
who do vote, does the distinction between the voting and non-voting population be-
come useless. However, it is more often the case that the income distribution of those
who vote is significantly different from the distribution of real income of the country
as a whole. Verba et al., (1993) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that
those who vote tend to be richer and better educated than those who do not vote.
So the voters, being richer on average than the total combined population of voters
and non-voters (Bennett and Resnick, 1990), tend to prefer policies with low State
redistributive intervention, even though the prevalence of poverty would elect rep-
resentatives more favorable to more redistributive polices. Hill and Leighley (1992),
indeed, found that redistributive public policies are more generous where the poor
are better represented. The asymmetric participation theory contribute to solve the
apparent paradox of democracies with free elections and income inequality growth
but does not say anything to explain the birth of populism.
The second theory to explain why income distribution is got more and more un-
equal despite median voter theorem is the policy-bundle theory by Roemer, 2001,
according to which voters’ preferences do not include only the income distribution
level; they vote also on the basis of their values. Corneo and Neher (2015) find that
redistributive policies tend to adjust to the preferences of the voters who hold median
views on values issues. In order to win elections, in a context of predominance of
the value issue, the parties tend to satisfy the median value (and not income) prefer-
ences; however, voters with median value preferences do not necessarily have median
income preferences. There are cases in which the predominance of the value issue is
correlated with a greater redistributive preference and vice versa. In a lot of cases
the majority of voters are against redistributive policies. A common outcome from
both investigation and experimental evidence is that people often express a demand
for redistribution that apparently contradicts their self-interest. In a more general
version of the median voter, redistribution preferences of voters may depend on non-
pecuniary factors. Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Corneo and Grüner (2002), Dahlberg
et al. (2012), Fong (2001), Höchtl et al. (2012), Klor and Shayo (2010), Luttmer
(2001), Luttmer and Singhal (2011), Shayo (2009) and Tyran and Sausgruber (2006).
The main non-pecuniary concerns are: the perception and tolerance of inequality, the
perception of social mobility, identity and the social status (Corneo, Neher: 2015). In
the current socio-economic context, not all these non-pecuniary concerns are good to
explain the increased inequality income in democracies.
As for justice, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) note that often "individuals have views
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regarding redistribution that go beyond the current and future states of their pock-
etbooks. These views reflect different ideas about what an appropriate shape of the
income distribution is: in practice, views about acceptable levels of inequality". Eco-
nomic self-interest appears to be a rather weak predictor of voting behavior: poor
people do not necessarily vote for extensive redistribution of income, and rich people
sometimes support welfare programs from which they do not expect to benefit. The
hypothesis of Alesina and giuliano (2010), could have been true for the last decades,
explaining why democracies failed to limit inequalities, but it is unlikely that the
current income distribution, at least in industrialized countries, is considered fair by
the population, just because the inequality levels nowadays are at record comparing
them to the statistics history (Oxfam, 2016).
The perception of social mobility is another factor that could reduce importance
to income distribution. Benabou and Ok (2001), found, in their model, that there
can be a range of individuals with income below the mean who oppose such policies
because they rationally expect to be above the mean in the future, and the mass of
people who oppose redistribution can be a majority in the population. Again, also
for the perception of social mobility, it could have prevented redistributive polices
in the last decades, but it seems hard to state it for the last years. Chetty et al.
(2014), indeed, found that the increased income inequality in the US has grown the
"birth-lottery" and Corak (2013) showed that intergenerational mobility is lowered
by the more polarized labor market and this trend is likely to continue. Therefore,
a lot of people that nowadays are below the mean income, have less rational reasons
to expect to be above the mean in the future, furthermore they could not oppose
redistribution anymore.
A different case is for the complex theme of Identity. Sometimes, individuals take care
not only about their own self-interests but also about the status of their group. This
feature is an implication of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, Tajfel
and Turner, 1986) which states that people vote in order to protect their group. Often
people do not vote their economic self-interest; they also vote their identity (Shayo,
2009). Two prominent identity are nation and class. If income distribution enhances
the status of the lower class more than it does national status then the class identifica-
tion makes redistribution a more important issue. On the opposite, if members of the
lower class tend to think themselves more as members of the nation as a whole than
as members of the class as whole, they are less concentrated on income redistribution
and vote for a lower level of redistribution. In the last years, both national identity
and income class identity have come back in importance affecting the final election
outcomes. Inglehart and Norris (2016) have shown that in South America, in the
United States and in Europe, the society is becoming increasingly polarized, not only
in income but also in values, splitting the voters in two groups: one liberally-minded
and the other traditionally-minded. Income inequalities and social identity are the
two sources of populism. Populism, therefore, is not only a classical redistributive
political activism (in favor of lower income class), but it holds also social identity
issues, widening its protests from income inequality to globalization (in favor of na-
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tional sovereignty) and migration (in favor of ethnic homogeneity of the nation).
The job polarization found in the previous section and widely confirmed in the liter-
ature has been causing a growing income inequalities from 1990s (Frey et al., 2018)
meanwhile globalization, migration and the Great Recession reinforced both the na-
tional and class identity (Colantone and Stanig, 2019). The growing wave of elections
with an unexpected outcome for the middle class, defined under the generic category
of "populism", seems to be the latest confirmation of the hypothesis that the increase
in inequality mainly due to job robotization (class status) mixed to identity threats
from globalization and liberal progressivism (national status), lead to a radicalization
of the political framework, in contrast to the interests of the mean voter (Figueira,
2018).
Populism is a political category different from classical ideologies in the 20th cen-
tury. In according to Mudde (2007), populism is characterized by three factors: anti-
establishment (opposing the ’elites’ and depicting the establishment as corrupt); au-
thoritarian (emphasizing personal power of a charismatic leader and/or direct democ-
racy instead of representative democracy); nativist (against multiculturalism). For
this reasons the populists are often considered "heterogeneous" in their policy pro-
posals (Colantone and Stanig, 2019). The definitions of "left" and "right" too, as
political categories, seem to mix and disappear in the populist movements. This is
certainly due, in part, to the convergence in political views between the traditional
leftist and the right-wing parties which has made them less distinguishable from one
another (Albright, 2010). The right and the left are merging more and more, sharing
common values and discarding their historically divisive goals to favor this union. As
the historical right increasingly embraces ’civil rights’ and ’multiculturalism’, the his-
torical left relinquishes ideals of redistribution and class struggle. Thus, in opposition
to this process of epochal political transformation, populism is emerging as a political
force that welcomes certain elements traditionally belonging to the "left" and others
more traditionally attributable to the "right". According to the median voter theo-
rem, the most extreme fringes of population abstain from voting when parties with
too similar programmatic content prevail; however, the more extreme socio-economic
and environmental conditions become, the more radical political positions begin to
seem more reasonable and by acquiring greater support they force politics to become
radicalized in order to respond to new popular needs. This would ultimately return
certain extreme fringes of the population to voting in a ”contagion” effect (Mudde
2004, Rooduijn et al, 2014, Rydgren, 2005) that could explain the birth and the suc-
cess of populism.
On the left, populism mutates the struggle against those it identifies as the ’elites’ and
the great economic lobbies in the name of greater redistributive justice; while on the
right, populism embodies the awakened sense of community and national identity in
opposition to globalization and cosmopolitism. Consequently, it fights against mass
immigration and the consequent ’multiculturalism’ and instead aims for the recovery
of some traditional values of the family in opposition to the latest developments of
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’civil rights’. In particular, The recent migratory flows that have affected Europe in
the last 20 years have surely influenced the voters who need identity protection (Dal-
hberg et al., 2012). Inglehart and Norris (2016) stressed that a common catalyst for
populist movements is voter dissatisfaction, for both economic and value issues. The
economic dissatisfaction emerges from changing economic trends with a significant
impact on society, including globalization, job insecurity and inequality. The cultural
reason is a ’backlash’ against the rise in progressive values since the 1970s, in rela-
tion to multiculturalism, gender equality and human rights (Inglehart, 1990). Similar
factors are found by Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) with their concept of ’declinism’,
which is a political view according to which societies are getting worse due to multi-
culturalism, globalization, environmental issues and moral principles. In this context
populism is combining the social identification of nation with the social identification
of income class, widening the electorate in inedited ways. This could be the reason
why it managed to win elections in a lot of countries.
However, within populism, there are at least two souls; we see this, for example,
by comparing the first populist movements born among Western countries with those
of Latin America (Kaltwasser, 2012). The economic programs of the populists range
from extreme-left pro-redistribution platforms to rather conservative ones. From an
economic perspective, then, it is rather difficult to identify a single populist platform
(Colantone and Stanig, 2019). A part of the ex-middle-class hopes to "come back".
They give their vote to populist forces that promise to restore the old Fordist and fam-
ily capitalism, undermined by globalization and the financialization of the economy.
There is a part of the ex- middle-class that feels dissatisfied by having seen the wealthy
classes grab almost all the economic growth of the last two decades. Elchardus and
Spruyt (2016) emphasized the link between "feelings of relative deprivation" and at-
traction to populism. These voters are attracted by political parties which oppose to
the magnates of international finance, the opening of economies to the international
markets, the mass immigration and therefore, as a corollary, the defense of national
economy and identity (nationalist populism). On the other hand, an important slice
of low-income people, especially young people with significantly lower prospects for a
quality life-style compared to that enjoyed by their parents, could instead reject the
capitalist order itself. This could give rise to populist political forces promising the
nationalization of large amounts of capital from the hands of multinationals, banks
and industrialists, and putting social production under collective control. Further-
more, faced with the prospect of not being able to afford to have a family because of
employment instability and tight work schedules, coupled with the need to move to
different countries to pursue their jobs, many of them could rediscover the values of
family and patriotism (socialist populism).
The real difference between these two forms of populism lies in their different ob-
jectives. We see this gap examining what they mean when they talk about ’elites’.
Both forms of populism, in fact, oppose a Power, but it is not exactly the same for
both: for nationalists this power is represented by the banks, by Jewish finance and
by Masonic lodges; for the socialists this power is also certainly represented by banks,
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lobbies and Freemasonry, but to these institutions they add the multinationals as well
as the medium-small and private family-run firms, in favor of an economy managed
collectively. Both forms of populism then claim the principle of ’nation’, but here
again they each define it differently: the nationalist populists interpret the nation as
a means of building the country’s economic supremacy even at the cost of damaging
others countries and reducing the attention to income class issue; the socialists defend
the principle of ’nation’ as a tool to allow the people to govern themselves, i.e. to
liberate themselves from the domination of international bodies of dubious democracy
(Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007) and to defend employment and labor rights against the
uncontrollable fluctuations of international markets. Finally, both forms refer to tra-
ditional cultural forms: nationalist populists focus their rhetoric on mass immigration,
fighting it harshly but at the same time without analyzing its deep causes (Mudde,
2013); moreover, they are culturally opposed to unconventional gender philosophies
and claim the indisputable preeminence of the traditional patriarchal family. Social-
ist populist movements not only oppose mass migration interpreted as a shift of the
industrial reserve of low-cost unemployees, they also propose policies of active po-
litical and economic support in the countries of origin of the emigrants so that the
causes that generate it are remedied; finally, they oppose gender theory and defend
the primacy of the natural family (despite respecting the different sexual orientations)
devoid of patriarchal or matriarchal interpretations.
Who will prevail? No one can say. Almost certainly, if the condition of inequality and
identity instability do not change over the next two decades, populist movements are
likely to become stronger. Moreover, the more time passes, the fewer people there
will be who have been part of the middle class in the past and therefore, perhaps, the
consensus to adhere to a socialist form of populism could grow more rapidly than the
tendency towards nationalist populism. Furthermore, it appears quite clear that the
political distance between nationalist and socialist populist forms will become more
and more evident as traditional parties are definitively defeated and marginalized.
Once the common enemy, ’Globalism’, is eliminated the two factions will face off
more openly, each one defending its own political vision. But before this can happen,
the residual middle classes, by mutual agreement with the new rich, could opt for
an authoritarian regime, as an extreme measure to curb the advance of populism. It
is not a coincidence that the residual middle-classes together to upper classes have
begun to speak of congenital ’malfunctions’ of democracies as they would allow ’ex-
tremist’ forces to rise to power. They also coined the oxymoronic term ’authoritarian
democracy’ to identify democracies with a populist government; moreover, they in-
vented social categories as ’hater groups’, to delegitimize their political opponents
and justify their ’corrective’ (coercive) intervention.
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2.4 Conclusions
This paper confirms the trend that has long been established in the literature: we
are moving towards a society where there is less and less need for routine jobs (being
replaced by machines, in particular by ICTs and artificial intelligence), whether they
are skilled or unskilled. This paper updates these findings to show that this process
has advanced beyond the results of the last study by Goos et al. (2009). At the same
time, the paper shows that this change in job structure has been accompanied by a
progressive reduction in the number of medium-income jobs (typical of the clerical
class) in favor of high and low income jobs. Compared to Acemoglu and Autor’s
(2010) findings, our updated outcomes revealed that even the number of medium-
income jobs has been reduced. This double long-term trend has produced a rise in
inequalities and a permanent thinning of the middle class. The current income distri-
bution curves are no longer a Gaussian but are going towards a world dominated by
the Power Law function. Under such conditions, extreme radical political ideologies
are far more likely to develop.
If the trend of inequality is not reversed, sooner or later the ousted members of the
middle class, now impoverished, could unite their votes with the traditional members
of the working class, and together they could reach more than the majority of votes
in the parliaments. Today the permanent full-time employment rate is lower than at
any time in the last 20 years (OECD stat), the real income of lower-class jobs is be-
low 1990s levels. Meanwhile, productivity, GDP, corporate investment, and after-tax
profits are also at record highs (OECD stat). The probability that new social disor-
ders will arise and the consequent danger for liberal societies are the main concern
for many Western countries. If the aforementioned trends are not reversed, greater
political and social turbulence than ever before will have to be expected in the coming
years. At the moment, working conditions and the situation of job distribution are
experiencing completely unprecedented upheaval.
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Inflation as Income Distribution
3.1 Introduction
The literature explains inflation by following mainly two opposite approaches: mone-
tarism according to Friedman (1970), Lucas (1972) and more recently to Evans (2017)
and bargaining based on the writings of Sraffa (1960), Minsky (1986), Krishna (1991)
and more recently Pacitti (2015). The first approach emphasizes the importance of
the Central Bank and the decisions about monetary emission it can dictate, or the
effects on monetary emissions indirectly generated by the banking system as a whole,
as influenced by the interest rate fixed by Central Bank itself. The second approach,
neo-corporatism, on the contrary, is focused on the role of workers’ collective bar-
gaining power; their demand for higher wages without a correspondent productivity
increase, would force employers to raise prices in order to reach their target profit
rates.
According to a large body of literature on neo-corporatism, when centrally organized
wage bargaining institutions, capable of enforcing negotiated wage restraint, exist in
a country, government policies of inflation containment are more effective since a huge
number of workers’ wages can be decided by a single institution. The risk persists
that these workers’ institutions may unceasingly continue to demand higher wages.
In this case it becomes harder to break the trend of increasing wages and thus, in
turn, inflation. From the monetarist perspective, the price-wage behavior of private
economic agents is determined by the agents’ expectations about monetary policies.
Inflation would indeed be a function of the policies followed by the monetary author-
ity from such a perspective. Havrilesky and Granato (1993), moreover, have argued
that independent and inflation-adverse central banks are far more important than
corporatist hypotheses. In response to these findings, Al-Marhubi and Willett (1995)
have criticized the statistical test used by Havrileski and Granato, following Calmfors
and Driffill’s (1988) approach, stating that instead of using a linear formulation of the
relationship between centralization and inflation, a curvilinear model (where interme-
diately centralized systems are the most inflationary) would have been more suitable
to testing the neo-corporatist thesis. Other important neo-corporatist contributions
may be found in Iversen (1999), who has shown that centralization of wage bargain-
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ing can significantly influence the optimal policy choices of a central bank. Daniels
et. al. (2006) concludes that, ceteris paribus, a greater central bank conservatism
in a nation with a larger extent of centralized wage bargaining will tend to reduce
inflation less than a country with a relatively larger share of companies that experi-
ence decentralized wage setting. Therefore, they state that coordinating wage setters
incentivize restraint in nominal wage growth since enterprises know that higher wages
contribute to inflation. Confirmation of this comes from Giordano (2001) who found
that countries where large unions figure prominently in the wage formation process
are not typically affected by particularly high rates of inflation. Milner (2018) also
states that companies, especially in the 70s, claimed to organized workers collectively
in order to sign multiyear agreements, thus managing to control prices.
To better inquire the monetarist and neo-corporatist theses, we need to look at in-
flation over a time sufficiently large where periods of high and persistent inflation
alternate to period of stable and low inflation. In this study we focuses on the decades
1970-2000. The causes of the "great" inflation of the 1970s and the consequent sud-
den period of small inflation remain a subject of debate in the literature. The strong
increase in the inflation rate in the ’70s could be explained, according to a monetarist
approach, by the expansionist monetary policy adopted with the purpose of minimiz-
ing the costs borne to finance the growing public debt in a lot of Western countries
(Bertoccio, 2002). The impact of monetary financing of a fiscal deficit on the infla-
tion rate was firstly formalized by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and then extended by
the study of Leeper (1991) who identifies three regimes that correspond to Active
Monetary/Passive Fiscal (AM/PF), Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal (PM/AF), and
Active Monetary/Active Fiscal (AM/AF). According to the monetarist perspective,
high and persistent inflation occurs when the monetary policy is more accommodating
than fiscal policy (PM/AF). Therefore, the high inflation of the ’70s is explained by
the excessive creation of money due to "fiscal dominance". On the other hand the
neo-corporatist approach underline the role of bargaining among social groups. Olson
(1982) argued that in market economies social groups with common interests engage
a rent-seeking behavior trying to extract gains for their members from generality. Ac-
cording to this perspective, the intensity of the distributive struggle is an important
determinant in explaining cross-national differences in unemployment and inflation
during the economic crisis of the 1970s. Paloheimo (1984), analyzing our same period
1970-2000, found that both the rates of unemployment and inflation were moderate
in countries with a low level of distributive struggle, while countries with a high level
faced severe problems of unemployment and inflation. Moreover, the stagflation of the
1970s, i.e. the combination of rising inflation and rising unemployment, had narrowed
the space for free collective bargaining and compelled many governments to intervene
in wage setting. As noted by Visser (2007) both direct and indirect state intervention
in wage negotiations, reached a peak in the late 1970s with relevant consequences in
terms of inflation.
In this paper, we employ production networks theory to estimate the impact of fis-
cal/monetary policy, unions-firms bargaining and technological evolution, on price
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dynamics. Two recent events have brought to the forefront the importance of inter-
connections between firms and sectors in aggregate economic performance. Consider
firstly the 2011 earthquake in Japan and secondly, on a grander scale, the financial cri-
sis in 2007-2009 recession. These events have brought with them a renewed emphasis
on the complex web of linkages that constitute the backbone of the economies. Terms
like "too interconnected to fail" or "systemically important firms" have become com-
monplace in public discourse (Carvalho, 2014). Therefore, the procedure we suggest
is an extension of the work of Sraffa (1961). We start from the Input-Output (I-O)
model used by Leontief (1986); secondly, we split the added-value of each sector into
its profits and wages, according to Sraffian approach. Finally, we employ the price
model in physical data showing an algebraical method which let us find the price
variation between two consecutive years without knowing the matrix of intermediate
inputs expressed in physical terms.
When we want to study prices through the production networks theory, the gen-
eral problem is that I-O tables do not distinguish between prices and quantities: they
only show their product. As noticed by De Mesnard (2006), physical matrices do not
exist in the operational world. Prices and physical tables are a chimera in the opera-
tional world. In these cases the literature suggests the price model in nominal terms
(Blair and Miller, 2009), however, it assumes that the prices ratios remain constant
when we apply distributive shocks on the added value vector v.
The first innovation of our model is that the prices ratios are free to vary as if we had
a physical matrix even if we cannot observe it. In this way the ratios between prices
are free to move as the conditions imposed on the system (v) vary, and therefore the
forecasts are more correct. Secondly, thanks to our model, we are able to explain vari-
ations on prices distinguishing the effects of profits, wages and the technology level
of the economy. Thirdly, in this study we apply this method to a long I-O time series
of observational data (1970-2000), that is rare to find in the literature. We found, for
the case of Italy, that its well-known period of "great inflation" can be described pri-
marily by a bargaining factor (among companies, trade-unions and the government)
and only secondly by technical progress. Our model, indeed, lets us distinguish the
weight that the technological factor had over this period (mainly the oil shock) from
the weight of trade union and political bargaining, finding interesting outcomes. As
fourth point, in the Sraffian and post-Ricardian Literature, usually, government has
no role on inflation, since the final outcome on prices only depends on the level of
profit-wage set. In this paper, on the opposite, we shall show that fiscal monetary
policy may affect prices through the channel of profits and wages, i.e. the well-known
phenomenon of political capture.
Chapter 2 develops the new model to study inflation; Chapter 3 applies the model
to the Italian case and distinguishes the inflationary effects induced by technology
from the purely distributive ones. In Chapter 4 we derive from the theoretical model,
six different price-trend scenarios ceteris paribus, which can be blended to describe
the complex phenomenon of inflation both in terms of technology, fiscal policy and
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unions-firms bargaining. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of the paper.
3.2 The Theoretical Model
Classical multi-function econometric models, such as VAR, SVAR or VEC, are usu-
ally employed to investigate the role of macroeconomic variables, such as interest rate,
exchange rate, monetary supply, etc., on prices, often linking shocks on raw material
prices as oil, to macroeconomic recessions (Cunado and de Gracia, 2003, Herrera and
Pesavento, 2009, Lardic and Mignon, 2006, Lee and Ni, 2002, Tang et al., 2010).
However, the econometric models used to analyze inflation have two drawbacks: they
ignore sector heterogeneity, and they are based on unverifiable assumptions on the
growth process (Abildgren, 2007; Wu and Zhang, 2013; Walheer, 2016). There is no
guideline, indeed, to choose the proper assumptions on the price equation of a coun-
try. Assumptions on technology, market structure, technological change, and other
aspects of prices are typically unverifiable. Furthermore, price analysis based on spe-
cific assumptions of the econometric models may lead to biased results.
The advantage of an I-O analysis can be observed at least from the following two
perspectives. First, a distributive, fiscal or technological shock is gradually realized
through the inter-connection between industries and the I-O tables give a compre-
hensive structural description of the entire economy (Carter, 1974, Leontief, 1986).
Therefore, by using the information provided by an I-O table, an I-O model enables us
to dissect the complex interdependencies of industries within an economy, and mea-
sure the complete inflationary effect of trade-union bargaining, technology progress
and fiscal policy. Secondly, while other empirical methods ignore the indirect or rip-
ple effects, an I-O analysis allows capturing inter-industry linkages and measures both
the direct and indirect effects of income, fiscal and technological shocks (Kerschner
and Hubacek, 2009, Liu and Ren, 2006). Since I-O models are based on periodical
input-output table or social accounting matrix instead of time series data, these stud-
ies provide more comprehensive policy evaluations than econometric studies, which
are highly dependent on stylized facts (Libo et al 2013). I-O models and computable
general equilibrium models are already utilized to shed more light on the agents be-
havior change and to simulate alternative outcomes under various shocks (Berument
and Tasci, 2002, Guivarch et al., 2009, Kerschner and Hubacek, 2009, Leduc and Sill,
2004).
These two drawbacks in econometric models and these two advantages of I-O models
form the motivation to propose a new I-O model taking sector heterogeneity into ac-
count, without resorting to any unverifiable assumptions on any aspects of the growth
process. In the I-O approach fiscal policy, coefficients of production, profits and wage
costs are exogenous since the general-equilibrium relationships that interrelate them
cannot be described by this kind of models. However, we do not intend to analyze how
bargaining process, political capture and technology progress occur and affect each
others. We are focused on a step forward: given the workers organization (in large
collective institutions or not), given the nominal wage level reached by trade-unions
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contention with companies, given the technology employed in response to bargaining
and developement, which is the final effect on inflation?
This model only explains prices by the level of real income distribution and by the
technology used. The results can only be interpreted in this way: for example, if the
observed data show that prices have risen, the model allows us to calculate the weight
by which general wage bargaining, profits and the technology employed have affected
them. However, it is not the intention of this article to study the social process
underlying the stipulation of wage contracts, political capture and the change of pro-
duction techniques. Certainly, these variables are interdependent, and the model does
not intend to make claims about how they affect each other. We are only interested
in investigating how each of these exogenous variables, individually, has impacted on
prices.
In the I-O literature there are two models to evaluate price effects of income dis-
tributions among sectors: the price model based on monetary data and the price
model based on physical data. The price model based on monetary data starts with
a nominal I-O table where physical quantities and prices are not known separately.
This approach sets prices equal to total cost of production (intermediate inputs plus
the added value) so that each price found is equal to 1. This illustrates the unique
measurement units in the base year, i.e. the amounts that can be purchased for 1$.
p̃ = (I−AT )−1v (3.1)




), v is a vector of added values divided by gross products expressed in
nominal terms (x), so that: v = [v1/x1, ..., vn/xn]. In the base year p̃ is a unitary
vector; variations in v causes variations in p̃ that coincide with percentage variations
in (unknown) prices.
On the opposite, the price model based on physical data finds the exact value of
prices starting from an I-O table expressed in physical data.
p = (I−CT )−1v (3.2)




), and v is the vector of added value divided by gross products expressed
in physical terms (q). Either the value-based coefficients, A, or the physical coef-
ficients, C, are assumed fixed in applications of the input-output model. However,
assuming fixed ci,j (i.e, a fixed "engineering" production function) has been seen by
many as less restrictive than fixed ai,j (a fixed "economic" production function), be-
cause in the latter case both a physical coefficient, ci,j , and a price ratio, pi/pj , are
assumed unchanging (Blair and Miller, 2009). For this reason we prefer to adopt the
price model based on physical data.
There are two main innovation in our model: we split the added value vector v
between profits and wages; we use a I-O physical data approach without knowing
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the matrix C. Following the Sraffian approach, if we separate profits from wages,
we would need of an adding condition for wage determination. Let us consider the
following set of equations which represents a generic economic system:
x′1Px ⊕ y′1Py ⊕ ... ⊕ z′1Pz = XPx
+ + + +
x′2Px ⊕ y′2Py ⊕ ... ⊕ z′2Pz = Y Py
+ + + +
... ... ... ... = ...
+ + + +
x′nPx ⊕ y′nPy ⊕ ... ⊕ z′nPz = ZPz
= = = =
x̃Px ỹPy ... z̃Pz
Where X,Y, ..., Z are the total supply of each sector’s i product expressed in phys-







n) are the intermediate (in physical terms) consumptions nec-
essary to realize the sectors’ products in their gross quantities1. The system is in
equilibrium if it holds: X > x̃, Y > ỹ, ..., Z > z̃. The difference between the vertical
sum of gross production (XPx, ..., ZPz) and the horizontal sum of intermediate inputs
consumed (x̃Px, ..., z̃Pz), determine the GDP2.




1Py + ...+ z
′
1Pz)(1 + r1) +WL1 = XPx
(x′2Px + y
′
2Py + ...+ z
′
2Pz)(1 + r2) +WL2 = Y Py
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(x′nPx + y
′
nPy + ...+ z
′
nPz)(1 + rn) +WLn = ZPz
Where r1, ..., rn are the different rate of profits for each production; W is the total
payroll paid to all the workers of economy; L1, ..., Ln are the shares of total payroll
in the economy (W ), paid by each sector and they add up to 13.
1The sums per line are not algebraic, but economic, indeed they are indicated by ⊕: this symbol
states that, for example in the first line, to produce X quantity of the first sector product, it is
necessary to consume x′1 quantity of the same product, y
′
1 quantity of y, and so on until the z
′
1
quantity of z. On the contrary, the sums per column are algebraic since they represent the amount
of a given sector’s product demanded by the other ones as an input.
2We assume, as in the I-O tables used in this paper, that all sector’s products are meanwhile used
as final and intermediate goods. Therefore the difference between the vertical sum of gross production
and the horizontal sum of products consumed during the production process, correspond to value
added + taxes less subsidies on products (for intermediate and final uses), i.e. GDP according to









This system may be written in matrix form as the following product:

X − x′1(1 + r1) −y′1(1 + r1) . . . −z′1(1 + r1) −L1






















In a more compact form we have:






Where q̂ is the diagonal matrix whose elements in the main diagonal are the gross
products expressed in physical terms; r̂ is the diagonal matrix whose elements in the
main diagonal are the profit rates sector by sector; ` is the vector of labor inputs and p
is the price vector. The system has n equations but there are n+1 unknown variables
(n prices and W). In order to find the solution vector p, we should determine another
condition which contains at least a quantity of one good of the system. We should
choose a linear combination which fits very well with our aim of inflation determi-
nation. For now, we shall define this generic equation as: H(qx, qy, ..., qz, qL) = G,
where qx, ..., qz are quantities of each sector’s product and qL is a quantity of Labour
(they could be all zero except for at least one). The complete system of equations is:
X − x′1(1 + r1) −y′1(1 + r1) . . . −z′1(1 + r1) −L1

























In a more compact form:[







Where g is the vector of known terms. Now, we have a square matrix [(n+1)×(n+1)]










The solution vector identifies both all prices in an economic system and the level
of total payroll, once fixed the rate of profits. The property of this system is that
it finds the equilibrium prices for each industry, depending on the level of income
distribution, that is just what our paper would test.
In practice, statistics offices evaluate nominal Input-Output tables for n sectors and
the total amount of wages, so that, indirectly, the rates of profit may be calculated
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for each sector. However, we cannot observe the matrix C because databases provide
only nominal I-O tables. Furthermore, it is impossible to find the prices of sectors’
products with equation (4). Even though it is impossible to accomplish anything by
using a single matrix, with a time series of nominal I-O tables at constant prices, we
have developed a way to evaluate the variation in prices with an approach similar to
(4).
The main problem to employ our approach is to separate prices from quantities.
If we knew a time series of physical I-O tables, we could test if prices depend on in-
come distribution among firms and workers, within each sector. To manage this issue,
we firstly adopt a time series of nominal I-O tables in constant prices, so that we are
certain that variations in intermediate inputs over time are only due to changes in the
technology of the system. Afterwords, we build up the classical intermediate coeffi-
cients matrix A by dividing each column of intermediate inputs in nominal I-O tables
(x′i, y′i, ..., z′i) by the nominal gross value of each sector’s product (P1X,P2Y, ..., PnZ).
These nominal I-O tables are in constant prices (we indicate it by Ap), therefore,
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We do not know the real matrix of intermediate coefficients as we can only configure
a Ap matrix, whose elements consist in the inseparable product of the intermediate
coefficients (x1, ..., xn; ...; z1, ..., zn) and the prices ratio (P1P2 , ...,
P1
Pn




We image to gather separately all the prices ratio in a new matrix that we call Shadow
Matrix Prices Ratio. If we could separate the real intermediate coefficients in matrix
Ap from the Shadow Matrix Prices Ratio, getting the canonical matrix C in physical
data, we could use C to find physical intermediate quantities. By C, indeed, it would
be possible to set-up a homogeneous linear system of equations by which (knowing
only the gross quantity of one of the n sector’s product of the system) getting quanti-
ties X,Y, ..., Z; at that point we could apply (4) and find prices. Unfortunately, there
does not seem to be any way to carry out the Shadow Matrix Prices Ratio from Ap
matrix, nevertheless, as we are going to show, if our goal is to know the percentage
variations in prices, we do not need of C; we can indeed substitute C with Ap, the
nominal I-O table at constant prices.4.
4The problem would occur if we wanted to know the absolute value of prices industry by industry,
but this is not the goal of our paper.
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Now, we show how to find the correct prices variations without knowing the real
intermediate coefficients matrix. Let us imagine that Ap matrix represents the real
intermediate coefficients matrix of another economic system. In this case, for finding
prices, we should start by determining the gross products X,Y, ..., Z. We need to set-
up a linear system of equations which includes Ap. The horizontal sum of Ap matrix
rows are the total intermediate consumption of sector’s i product (let us call them C);
the ratio φ =
D−C
D
, where D is the generic gross product, is expressed by quantities
of the same good, i.e. it is independent from the price of D. By construction, it holds:
(I−Ap − φ̂)q = ~0 (3.5)
Where I is the identity matrix; φ̂ is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are
the vector φ; q is the vector of unknown gross products and ~0 is the null vector: this
is a homogeneous linear system of equations, which admits non-trivial solutions (dif-
ferent from Xi = 0 for any i) since its determinant is always 0; moreover, the solution
vector is never negative since 1 is always the maximum eigenvalue of BT. Therefore,
this system finds the gross products that guarantee the surplus value objective is ex-
actly φ for any i. By using this system to solve the problem, we find infinite solutions
which depend on the value assumed by the sector’s product chosen to represent a
measurement value Z̃ (the "numeraire"). We assume to chose the sector’s product z
as the numeraire, therefore we get this solution vector:
q̃ =

















Where I(−1), Ap(−1) and φ̂(−1) are the matrixes I, Ap and φ̂ reduced of their last
row and column (since in this case we chose as numeraire the last sector’s product
of the system). The vector q̃ coincides with the real gross output vector in physical
terms only if we choose the real value for the numeraire Z̃. Obviously, we do not
know it, however, we are gong to show that it is not necessary for our analysis; we
can freely assign a random value to the numeraire. Now, if we plug (6), the gross





























With the quantities thus determined, once the last generic condition H(qx, qy, ...,
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qz, qL) = G is chosen, system (4) is defined and it is possible to evaluate prices.
Naturally, the prices so found refers to an economic system whose real intermediate
coefficient matrix is the Ap matrix. This is not valid for our initial economic system,
where matrix Ap contains the Shadow Matrix Prices Ratio. However, we are going
to show that the variation of prices observed is the same found in (7) through the
gross products get by (6), even using the Ap matrix with price ratios.
In order to demonstrate this, we shall consider a hypothetical economic system which
contains only two sectors, for simplicity’s sake (though easily applied on a general
scale). We shall also assume the generic condition H(qx, qy, ..., qz, qL) = G as:
P1Xθ + P2Y γ = G
This is a general condition, which states that a generic percentage θ of gross quantity
X and a generic percentage γ of gross quantity Y is equal to a generic value G. The
system in matrix form is:
X − x
′
1(1 + r1) −y′1(1 + r1) −L1
−x′2(1 + r2) Y − y′2(1 + r2) −L2








If physical quantities are known (X,Y, x1, x2, y1, y2) we can easily solve the system




















L2(XY γ−Y x′1γ+Xθy′1−Y γr1x′1+Xr1y′1θ)+L1(XY θ+Y γx′1−Xθy′2+Y γr2x′2−Xr2y′2θ)
However, as we noticed, prices and quantities are not separable in classical nominal
I-O tables. In this path, we firstly build up the Ap matrix and secondly, accordingly
to (6), we find the quantities X̃, Ỹ , ..., Z̃ by fixing the numeraire at a randomly value
k. In this example the system is:[
1− x1 − φ1 −P1P2x2














X and that Xx1 = x
′
1. Solving
by the first equation we get:
X −Xx1 −Xφ1 − P1P2x2K = 0


























At this point, by multiplying the Ap matrix by q vector of gross quantities we get
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(1− x1)(1 + r1) −kx2y1(1 + r1) −L1
P1
P2






















Recall that we know the value of x2 but that we cannot decompose it since we do







) in p̃(1) and p̃(2), we discover that these equations are very similar























k(L2(XY γ−Y x′1γ+Xθy′1−Y γr1x′1+Xr1y′1θ)+L1(XY θ+Y γx′1−Xθy′2+Y γr2x′2−Xr2y′2θ))














From these equations, it is possible to state that they differ only for variables k, Y, P1, P2,
but these variables do not affect price variations over time due to income distribu-
tion (r1, r2, L1, L2) and technology (x1, x2, y1, y2) changes; this finding also holds in
the case with n sectors5. k, indeed, is randomly fixed at an initial value and after
the first period it varies according to the real percentage variations of Y over time6;
Y varies according to the evolution of the system over time, however, as just ob-
served, k moves in the same percentage of Y therefore, their ratio is always constant,
i.e. they together do not affect price percentage variations; P1, P2 are fixed since
we consider I-O tables in constant prices. Of course, the absolute value of prices
is different: p(1) 6= p̃(1) and p(2) 6= p̃(2)). However, their equations are identical




Y ), thus percentage variations in
5In case of n sectors the q of solutions for real gross productions is:



























6Even if we cannot know Y because I-O tables provide only P2Y , Through I-O tables in constant
prices we can get the real percentage variation of Y over time since P2 is fixed.
91
prices due to r1, r2, L1, L2, x1, x2, y1, y2 are identical7. Moreover, this study indicates
price percentage variations do not depend on θ and γ, and this means that we can
constrain the system with whatever relationship exists between X and Y . Through
this demonstration we identified a procedure which allows the researcher to choose
the final relationship of the system completely freely, according to his/her needs.
Finally, we need to specify the generic condition H(qx, qy, ..., qz, qL) = G, that is
the last equation of the system, necessary to solve it. Recall that in this paper we
investigate the relationship between income distribution and prices. Therefore, the
generic condition should be an equation which fixes exogenously the total payroll of
the economy. In this way the system lets us know the economy’s price level in cor-
respondence to wages (or profits) variations, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the last
condition of the system should define the total wage W with an equation expressed
in gross productions X,Y, ..., Z.
The total wage may be determined by the difference between the total revenue coming
from selling the gross production of each sector (nominal gross value) and the total




x′i(1 + ri) + Y −
n∑
i=1
y′i(1 + ri) + ...+ Z −
n∑
i=1
z′i(1 + ri) =W (3.9)






ˆ̃q(I− (I+ r̂)ATp(−1) − l) l






Where e is the unitary vector and the vector on the right hand is g. By plugging
ˆ̃q found in the equation (6) in the equation (10), we get the vector of prices p̃. This
system, by the algebraic point of view, has n+1 unknown variables and n+1 equations,
therefore it is determinable. However, the system has only n unknown variables (the
prices), since the last ’unknown’ variable, W , is the known term of the last equation
of the system8. This choice is intentional; by this way both the rate of profits and
the total payroll become exogenous and so we are able to simulate how prices vary,
freely changing the rate of profits (r1, r2, ..., rn), the percentage of total payroll in the
production of each commodity (L1, L2, ..., Ln) and the nominal level of total payroll
(W ). In other words, we can determine how the price system moves according to the











8By the algebraic point of view, there are really n+1 unknown variable, and the system determines
the n prices and the nominal level of wage W ; theoretically, the nominal wage found by the system
should be equal to the one chosen for the known term equation (9). We have checked it in the
empirical application.
9On the opposite, if we chosen whatever other equation different from (9), we could not study
movements in prices caused by income distribution. For example, if we specified an equation for
the nominal current GDP which sums up the added value of each sector, we would surely find the
current level of prices, but we could not simulate what happens if nominal wages increase since we
could only move (r1, r2, ..., rn), (L1, L2, ..., Ln) and the GDP value.
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3.3 Estimating Bargaining, Technological and Fiscal
Effects on Inflation
For the empirical analysis, we prefer long-run I-O tables since it is possible to test our
inflation definition with better accuracy. During the 70s and 80s, indeed, in quite all
industrialized countries there was high inflation and high bargaining among unions
and firms; in the 90s this trend reversed. If our theoretical model is correct it should
holds both in times of high and low inflation, thus we should test it on the long-run.
However, the most common I-O tables database collect data only from 1990/95 (see
WIOD database, OECD-ICIO, EORA-MRIO or EU-Eurostat)10. Therefore we used
the I-O tables in constant price elaborated by Rampa (2001) for the case of Italy11.
These tables, indeed, contains 42 sectors at constant purchaser prices (base year 1978),
from 1970 to 2000. The branch and primary input codes the usual ESA1979 and for
1997-2000 they were adjusted by Rampa starting from ESA95. The sectors are the
following:
ESA cl. Products
01. Agricultural, forestry and fishery products
03. Coal and lignite
05. Products of coking
07. Crude petroleum, natural gas and petroleum products
09. Electric power, gas, steam and water
11. Production and processing of radio-active materials and ores
13. Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals
15. Non-metallic mineral products
17. Chemical products
19. Metal products except machinery and transport equipment
21. Agricultural and industrial machinery
23. Office and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments
25. Electric goods
27. Motor vehicles
29. Other transport equipment
31. Meats, meat preparation and preserves
33. Milk and dairy products
35. Other food products
37. Beverages
39. Tobacco products
41. Textiles and clothing
43. Leather, leather and skin goods, footwear
45. Timber, wooden products and furniture
47. Paper and printing products
10WIOD: http://www.wiod.org/home OECD-ICIO: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter-
country-input-output-tables.htm EORA-MRIO: http://worldmrio.com/ EU-Eurostat:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/esa-supply-use-input-tables
11Data are free available at this link: http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/grampa/iotables/Data.html
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49. Rubber and plastic products
51. Other manufacturing products
53. Building and construction
55. Recovery and repair services
57. Wholesale and retail trade
59. Lodging and catering services
61. Inland transport services
63. Maritime and air transport services
65. Auxiliary transport services
67. Communication services
69. Services of credit and insurance institutions
71. Business services provided to enterprises
73. Services of renting of immovable goods
75. Market services of education and research
77. Market services of health
79. Other market services
81. Non-market services provided by general government
93. Domestic services and other non-market services
Table 3.1: Productions I-O tables
Sector 93th of the table is not consumed as an input for any other sector, there-
fore it can be eliminated since it has the only effect of consumption: i.e. it consumes
inputs from the other sectors but it is not consumed in turn. Consequently, the wages
paid by this sector are diverted from the total12. Sector 11th is not used as means of
production of other goods but it uses a few sectors’ products as means of production.
However quite all years it is not produced inside the economy, but only imported,
and in those years when it is involved, it requires, to be produced, only a very few
quantities of the other sectors’ products. For this reason, we eliminated it from my
calculations, expecting to observe only a very slight reduction in final GDP (for only a
few years). Without the elimination of sector 11th and 93th, we would have one (and
sometimes two) lines of zeros for each year, which would prevent us from inverting
matrix Ap since the determinant of every square matrix with a single row or column
of zeros, is zero.
In addition to I-O tables, our database provides data regarding total wages paid in
each sector every year; thus, indirectly, it is possible to calculate rates of profits13.
Finally, we chose the last commodity on the list (i.e. number 81th) as the numeraire
good and we fixed its value held in 1978, equal to 100000, and then we adjusted it
12The final outcome in terms of price variation is the same, while we can expect the GDP to be
reduced by the added value of 93
13The rate of profit is:
R−C−W
C
Where R is the total revenue of a generic sector (i.e. its nominal gross product), C is the total cost
in terms of means of production consumed in order to produce said good, and W the total payroll
paid in that sector.
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for its real growth over the period, using price tables indexes. With this last device,
using I-O tables in constant prices, we can be sure that any changes in I-O table
values over the years are due exclusively to real modification in means of production
and gross productions. Furthermore, I-O tables built up in this way do not have any
connection with their current vector of prices.
Determination of the inflationary trend from 1970 to 2000 was calculated using Mat-
lab software, without any distributive hypothesis, but only by applying the equation
(10) for all 31 corresponding I-O real matrixes. We recall that by construction, our
system is not linked in any way to the inflation observed. Indeed:
1) I-O tables are considered in constant prices, so any variations of their coefficients
over time can be explained only by technological changes.
2) profit rates are exogenous
3) Total payroll of the economy W and its shares within sectors are exogenous
Therefore, if we inserted the values observed of (r1, r2, ..., rn), (L1, L2, ..., Ln) and
W into the system (10) and if doing so, we found price vectors equal to the inflation
rate observed, this would mean that price levels are a consequence of income distri-
bution among income groups (point 2) and 3)) and changes in technology (point 1)).












Figure 3.1: Observed Inflation (blue) vs Inflation Defined by Equation 10 (red)
The graph is extremely accurate. This is not an estimation, but a definition. This
model, in fact, is not aimed at estimating inflation, but at finding a formula to de-
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fine it. Along the period 1970-2000, in Italy, as in a lot of other Western countries,
there have been a lot of shocks which affected inflation. Between 1970-1985 there
have been a highly conflicting bargaining among companies and workers which surely
was reflected on price level. Moreover, in 1973 and in 1979 happened the two oil
picks which also lead the World in an inflation crisis. Our definition of inflation
take into account of all these factors since the system of equation (10) depends on
these three exogenous variables recalled above: the technology employed, the nominal
profit rates (r1, r2, ..., rn), the nominal total payroll W and its shares within sectors
(L1, L2, ..., Ln).
The point 1) recalls for shortages in raw materials like petroleum or other lack due to
wars; the last two point recall for bargaining outcome. Therefore, our model can also
be used to separate the bargaining effects from the technology shocks effects on infla-
tion. Keeping constant the intermediate input matrix Ap (i.e. the technology) and
plugging in (10) only the level of wages and profits of the next period it is possible to
evaluate the weight of income distribution in the formation of inflation, year by year.
On the opposite, keeping constant the current profits, wages and the numeraire Z̃ and
plugging in (10) the matrix Ap of the next period (i.e. the technology of the system
in the new period), we find the weight of technology shock in the determination of
inflation, year by year.











Figure 3.2: Inflation Share due to Bargaining (blue) vs Inflation Share due to technology Shocks
(red)
We did it for the case of Italy. Figure 2 shows a bar chart which split the effect of
bargaining (in blue) and the effects of technology shocks (in red) on prices. Overall,
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the effect of technology over time, tends to reduce the price level. This outcome is
consistency to the economic theory If we assume that the technology employed in
the system improves year by year, thanks to innovation. Improvements in technol-
ogy, indeed, lead to produce more with less raw materials; if nominal wages and the
profit rates remain constant, the final effect is a price reduction. However, even if
technology shocks have generally a reducing effects on inflation, there are also some
years when this rule does not holds. In 1974 and from 1980 for the three consecutive
years, technology shocks increase inflation. This occurs, by the theoretical point of
view, when there is a shortage in raw material. Indeed, we recall that in 1973 and
in 1979 there have been the two oil crises; this shortage reduced also the availability
of oil for all the other sectors and in the end, less goods could have been realized
in the years next these shocks. Within this scenario, nominal wages and profit rates
did not change, therefore the final outcome was a negative technology shocks which
contributed to make price grow. Our estimations find an increment of approximately
6% due to technology; considering that the oil price passed in 1973 from 2.7$ to 11$ in
a single year (+307.4%) this seems to be consistent with the estimations of LeBlanc
and Chinn (2004), Cologni and Manera (2008) and Choi et al. (2018) who forecast
an increment between 0.1-0.8% of general price index for a 10% of oil price growth.
Moreover, Figure 2 shows a positive technology shock also in 1992; we could relate it
to the conclusion of ’mani pulite’, the nationwide judicial investigation into political
corruption and the end of the so-called ’First Republic’ in Italy. Between 1990-1992
Italy re-structured its economy through great privatizations, the pension reform, the
strong devaluation of Lira in 1992, the elimination of the so-called "scala mobile"
(costof-living adjustment of wages) always in 1992 and experienced institution inno-
vations with the introduction of majoritarian representation system; this could have
de-stabilized the economy with negative short-run technological effects as noted by
Miniaci and Weber (1999). Indeed, we can observe that the technology shocks on
inflation in 1990-1991 were close to 0 and even positive in 1992. We finally found a
relevant positive technology shock on inflation in 1997, that could be related to the
Asian financial crisis which contributed to decrease the availability of a lot of raw
materials or primary goods that Western economies were used to import as shown in
Blalock and Roy (2007).
We finally try to estimate the weight of ’fiscal inflation’ on the total price growth
over time. When studying the evolution of inflation and output over the past sixty
years, the role of fiscal policy has often been neglected (Bianchi and Ilut, 2017). How-
ever, economists such as Cochrane (1998, 2011) and Sims (1994) conjectured that
the original sin that led to the rise of inflation in the 70s should be sought out in the
conduct of fiscal policy during those years. The fiscal theory of inflation is based upon
a seminal paper by Sargent and Wallace (1981), who argued that the rate of inflation
is dependent upon the coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities. When
the fiscal authority is dominant over the Central Bank (like in the decades 60s-90s in
Europe) it sets the current and future budget balances and determines the amount of
seigniorage income required from the monetary authority. Therefore, the monetary
authority may create extra money in order to respond to the requirements of the gov-
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ernment, weakening, by this way, its control over price stability. In the literature, this
version is named as the weak-form of fiscal theory (Carlstrom and Fuerst 2000) and is
accepted largely as the correct way of interpreting the fiscal-monetary interrelations
in the determination of inflation. No mention of fiscal inflation is present in Sraffian
and post-Ricardian Literature.
Fiscal policy modifies the income distribution, indeed it is just a redistribution of
total added value of the economy among wages and profits. Knowing the trend of
fiscal balances over time, our model theoretically allows to split the effect of fiscal
policy on inflation by the effect of bargaining among unions and firms. We should
only know, exactly, the share of fiscal imbalance devoted to increase labor income and
the residual part spent in favor of profits. This data is not directly available, however
we show the procedure with the following example, assuming that the total fiscal im-
balances have been spent in order to increase the labor income (W ). What is more, it
is not an assumption too hard: the great part of fiscal imbalance is generally directed
to increase the number of people hired by the public sector, social assurances and pen-
sions; i.e., invoices for W , the total national payroll. furthermore, in general, only a
residual part of fiscal imbalance is moved to increase profits. In the following example,
we only need to subtract the current fiscal deficit to the total payroll observed, year
by year, and than replugging these new values in the equation (10). In doing so, we
use the official data of the Central Bank of Italy which provides yearly fiscal deficits
and surplus over quite two centuries. Moreover, we recall that the Italian fiscal deficit
have been mainly covered by the creation of new money over the period analyzed;
furthermore, the outcome we are going to get, recalls the above quoted literature on
the impact of monetary financing of a fiscal deficit, i.e. the price effects of money
creation for the government expenditures. Our findings confirm part of the literature.
The first outcome is that fiscal deficit affect inflation in a considerable way; the second
one is that fiscal deficits are not the only cause of price growth. As for the first finding
we observe by the Figure 3 that over the period 1970-1992 fiscal deficit contributed
to the total inflation for approximately 7-8 percentage points. This effects has con-
siderably reduced in the last 90s, but this is due to the decrement of fiscal imbalances.
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Inflation with Fiscal Effects
Inflation without Fiscal effects
Figure 3.3: Total Inflation (blue) vs Inflation without Fiscal Effects (red)
As for the second finding, we observe that even without fiscal deficits, inflation would
have been nevertheless high until 1983, and then it would have been stabilized around
zero mean. Over the period 1970-1983 Italian workers were highly unionized (OECD
statistics), every year there were thousands of strike hours (OECD statistics) and
workers representatives in the Italian parliament exerted a strong influence (Lombar-
dini, 2017). Therefore, the high inflation found for this period, after deducting the
fiscal effects, implies that the direct bargaining among unions and firms can heavily
affects the price level. More precisely, strong bargaining lead to high inflation mean-
while feeble bargaining do not produce any effect on the price level. However, as we
are going to show better in the next sections, fiscal policy could also be interpreted
as a bargaining outcome among firms and unions. In the end, the accuracy of our
theoretical model, proved empirically and shown in Figure 1, suggests that our ap-
proach is an effective way to define inflation. Furthermore, we can now deduct from
the model some theoretical economic implication on inflation.
3.4 Theoretical Implications
This way of proceeding may seem valid from an empirical point of view, but the
consequences of this model on economic theory are even more interesting since they
affect the economic debate on inflation and its origins. We have managed to describe
inflationary long-term trend by merely noting income distribution between wages and
profits, government monetary expenditure (implicit in wages and profit rates) and
real production variations among all economic sectors. Doing this and achieving an
accurate estimate may suggest that prices are a consequence of income distribution.
Therefore, their trends may depend primarily on social bargaining and its outcome,
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and, last but not least, on the effect of productivity growth, which gives rise to vari-
ations in inter-sectorial interdependencies.
We have studied six different scenarios. The exogenous variables to freely vary are:
the total payroll W , the vector of rates of profits r and the value of numeraire, i.e.
the technology shock. We are going to study what would happen, from a theoretical
point of view, to the price index trend over time, when these three variables separately
increase and decrease, ceteris paribus. We will use the same I-O table from 1970 (but
it really does not matter which we choose among the 31 analyzed in this study) for
all the simulation periods. In the aggregate data of total nominal wage and profit
rates, "government monetary intervention" is included. By this expression we mean
a policy of public expenditure which creates (or destroys) new money through direct
seigniorage or by bonds sold to the Central Bank. This policy may increase/decrease
wages of workers in the public sector, public pensions, enhance/lower unemployment
subsides or extend their duration, affect patronage policies or direct/indirect subsidies
to private firms. All these items are included in the total value of wages and rates of
profit, since both are expressed as gross values, comprehensive of social contributions,
i.e. of the redistributive effect of State intervention.
3.4.1 Case 1: wage increase
The graph below refers only to the I-O table of 1970, so price index variations are not
due to any change in real quantities inside matrixAp, nor to a movement of numeraire
good whose quantity remains fixed for all 30 steps. This is a way to keep constant
the technology in order to study the net effect on prices lead by bargaining among
workers and entrepreneurs. From this graph, as from all the subsequent graphs, it
is possible to see how income distribution may affect price trends, if everything else
remains constant. In this particular simulation, we made the total wage in 1970
increase at a constant spread (50,000 million lire) at each step14. The outcome shows
that if wages increase but the rate of profits and the level of production remain
the same, the price index will grow. This kind of inflation is neither monetary in
origin nor it is linked to the Central Bank’s interest rate expectations as stated by
Burton (1972). This is consistent with classical economic theory: with the same goods
produced, if workers obtain an increase in the nominal level of wages, in the face of
constant profit rates (i.e. increased proportionally in absolute), there is no other
mathematical possibility that a prices increase. From a bargaining point of view, this
situation means that workers, perhaps through trade unions and political parties,
may have tried to increase their nominal wages, but companies managed to pass wage
increases onto prices, maintaining a constant rate of profit. This is the classic issue
of ’wage inflation’ (Milner 2018, Burton, 1972). The final effect is neutral, from the
perspective of real distribution. In fact, when nominal wages increased, prices also
increased proportionally, while profit rates were stable. Every socio-economic group
may have earned more money, but prices all increased, so there was no real final effect.
Finally, this situation may also occur not only at high bargaining levels, but also
14The amount chosen does not change the theoretical final result.
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when government intervention is heavy and not directed to productive investments,
but to finance unproductive expenses by creating new money. For example, the
government could start paying high subsides to unemployed people, or hiring workers
unnecessarily, or increasing public pensions, or providing greater public subsidies to
firms as a result of clientelism. If the state does so with a considerable and continuative
financial effort, the final effect, ceteris paribus (i.e. fixed production and augmented
expenses financed not by taxes or other forms of compensations), will only be a rise
in prices, as noted in Faria (2001), Davig and Leeper (2011). I call this ’workers
patronage inflation’.
3.4.2 Case 2: wage decrease
In this simulation the total wage decreases at each step at the same rate while profit
rates remain constant. 15. Ceteris paribus, prices will drop, at an increasing rate.
This is because the real total national output stays stable, as do profit rates. Thus,
national income does not shift from one socio-economic group to another, but remains
in the hands of the same people, with the difference that nominal level of income has
been reduced. On the other hand, price indexes also decrease proportionally, so the
ratio between individual nominal income and prices remains constant.
15Simulation is built in a way that however wage are decreasing, they remain positive until the
last step.
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This situation may occur on the bargaining side, when a company’s management
and other employers are making cuts in payrolls thanks to their increased bargaining
power. This may be achieved by a combination of layoffs and decreased wages, or
by substituting the labor force with people coming from other socio-economic groups
who have less bargaining power, such as immigrates and people who have long been
unemployed, or by substituting labor with machines. On the other hand, while wages
are decreasing, profit rates remain stable. This happens, for example, when enterprises
decide to be more competitive by taking advantage of lower payrolls to reduce prices
of goods. This drop in wage is not necessary linked to unemployment, but mainly to
the outcome of bargaining between workers and employers. Moreover, certain external
factors may force employers to reduce their purchasing prices. In either case, profit
rates remain stable, wages decrease, but prices also fall proportionally, so in the end
income distribution is not affected, but nominal GDP is reduced. One of the possible
external factors which may force firms to lower prices may be caused by the reduced
purchasing power of society as a whole as a consequence of increased unemployment or
reduced wages. This is a typical post-crisis scenario, like the aftermath of the crash of
1929 or the most recent financial crisis in 2008. In the months following these events,
prices as well as wages decreased in the nations most severely struck by the crisis
(Stock and Watson 2010). Of course, such situations create a mixture of the kinds
of effects we have observed in the cases we have been studying here separately. In
these crisis scenarios, a decreasing wage level is often also followed by a reduction in
real production and consequently of profit rates. In this scenario, however, employees
are ineffectual: their trade union and political activity is quite absent; indeed, they
are subjected to pressure from the companies that employ them and suffer from the
general negative effect of the business cycle induced by this wage policy (Giordano
2001).
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Finally, from the perspective of government expenditure, this scenario may reflect a
policy of strict budget constraints which meanwhile may lead government to fire its
employees, to extend retirement age, to lower pensions, or to diminish other forms
of unproductive expenditure like subsides to efficient enterprises, or other form of
investments. These policies have the same effect, in the end, of reducing the nominal
income of all socio-economic groups, and may refer to a government which wants to
pay off its debts, as studied by Edgell and Duke (1982). But here, all other variables
being constant, real production does not drop, and so these policies only affect prices.
This could happen if, for example, cuts in public spending focus on unnecessary
costs, which, being unproductive by definition, would not cause any reduction in
real production. Conversely, by cutting these useless expenses, it is possible to gain
competitiveness by reducing the general prices of goods in the economic system.
3.4.3 Case 3: profit rates increase
Here I generate a cycle where all profit rates (for the sake of simplicity) are increased
by 1% at each step. All the other variables, as always, remain constant. Here the
model shows us that prices would rise at increasing rates. It is reasonable to assume
that since gross production remains steady, total wages will also remain the same.
In this case, how can profit rates increase? The only mathematical solution is that
prices will rise. This may occur following a long period of intensive bargaining which
results in profit rate increments that are out of proportion compared to wages, the
well-known ’profit inflation’ effect (David 1956). The simulation reveals what effect
different ranges of profit rate increases have on final prices. The final upshot here is
not neutral. While prices are rising, wages remain fixed, causing a loss in workers’
purchasing power. On the other hand, absolute profits are increasing, but so are the
rates of profits, and, since wages are fixed, the profit growth margin is more than
sufficient to compensate price increments. From the perspective of public spending,
this scenario refers to an increment in state subsidies to private firms, which are not
covered by taxes but by the means of bonds or seigniorage (anyway, money creation).
Another possibility is that the government agrees to pay higher prices for services
furnished by private companies. Also, other forms of patronage may collect rent from
new government sources which in turn will make profit rates increase and thus raise
prices, as recently reported by Barkan (2011). We would call this ’capitalist patronage
inflation’.
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3.4.4 Case 4: profit rates decrease
For this simulation, we let profit rates decrease at the same speed as in the previous
example: 1% per each simulation step, making the two studies comparable16. In this
case, when profit rates decrease systematically, ceteris paribus, the price index drops
at decreasing rates. If profit rates decrease while both real production and nominal
wage remain stable, prices will also have to drop to balance the only other variable
that has changed. This is not a neutral situation: during the process real wages
grow, while profits in absolute drop at a higher rate than prices, i.e. their real value
is reduced. From a bargaining point of view, this scenario describes an economic
system where workers do not demand better economic conditions, but where there
is increased competition between companies. The bargaining between new entrants
and incumbents and in general among all companies leads to a reduction in profit
rates, as described by Martin and Worz (2012). Finally, from the perspective of
public expenditure, to the contrary of what was stated in the previous section, the
government would have to end the patronage of some private companies, or start
paying lower prices for the same goods and services purchased from private producers.
In the end, the state may reduce its subsides to private firms or end its patronage
policies.
16Simulation are built in a way that profit rates decrease without becoming negative.
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3.4.5 Case 5: real gross quantities increase
In the following case the real gross quantity of the numeraire, rises at 1% at each step
of the simulation. This implies that all the other real gross product quantities will
also increase at the same rate, since they represent a proportion of the numeraire, by
definition. So real production in general is increasing at 1% at each step of simulation;
so, ceteris paribus (i.e. income distribution does not change), this means that prices
must decline. This simulation also shows that inflation rates are negative but their
absolute value is decreasing. The final effect on income distribution is neutral: in fact,
profit rates remain stable as do nominal total wages, while at the same time prices
are declining. Both social categories, private enterprises and workers, receive a higher
real income, but the proportions between them have not changed. This is consistent
since at each step, each person should be richer than before, as real production has
increased. Therefore, even though each social category is earning the same nominal
income, i.e. profits and wages are increasing, prices are decreasing, which means
that distribution remains the same. In terms of bargaining, this situation may occur
when the same number of workers produce more goods with more raw materials.
This is possible primarily thanks to new technologies which increase productivity.
Companies, in this scenario, choose to maintain the same rates of profit and to take
advantage of this increase in productivity by reducing prices, thus improving their
competitiveness. This is a real possibility which was evidenced by Sangho et. al
(2013) in the recent case of South Korea. Public expenditure plays no role, since the
variable of real production is the only one which changes in this scenario, and so no
monetary variations implemented by the government are assumed.
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3.4.6 Case 6: real gross quantities decrease
In the final case we are going to consider, the real gross quantity of the numeraire
declines at a fixed rate of 1% for each step of simulation. As in the previous section,
all the other real gross quantities, expressed in terms of the numeraire, will follow
the same trend at the same rate by definition. Here prices rise at increasingly faster
rates. Indeed, if nominal total payroll and profit rates are fixed, but real production
is decreasing, prices, mathematically, must rise. Companies have to face a drop
in real production, but they also want to earn the same nominal amount of profit,
while workers will not accept lower nominal wages; this leaves no other solution than
selling the smaller quantity of products at higher prices, in order to assure that final
revenue and nominal incomes remain constant. This scenario is neutral in terms of
distribution, but since the real income of both socio-economic groups drops, while
nominal wages and profits remain constant, prices will necessarily increase. This
kind of situation may arise during a crisis when productivity is reduced and/or the
availability of raw materials is limited (due to external factors like shortages - e.g. of
petroleum - or war) , while workers and business owners try to maintain the same
(nominal) income level, as described extensively by Roeger (2005) and Trehan (2005)
with regard to OECD countries. Public expenditure, at least theoretically, plays
no role in this situation, since the only variable modified in the simulation is real
production. This scenery could recall, for example, to the two petroleum shocks
occurred in 1973 and in 1979. The shortage of petroleum, so deeply linked to all
the other industrial sectors, lead to an increases in prices recorded in all Western
countries. Our model, indeed, applied for the case of Italy, finds two peaks in prices




As a result of these scenarios, we may know the following:
Inflation may be caused by intense bargaining between workers and companies. If
real production does not grow sufficiently to compensate nominal income increases in
wages, profit or both, due to this allocative competition, there will be inflation. But
inflation may also be caused by a sudden shortage of raw materials within a context
of fixed wages and rates of profit, or during and just after a war, when governments
try to legislate in order to maintain a constant level of wages, and the capitalists
attempt to keep profit rates steady. If a crisis due to a shortage of raw materials
intensifies bargaining between workers and employers, the effect on inflation will be
empowered. Finally, inflation may also be caused by a corrupt government which
indulges patronage requirements of enterprises or by a demagogic government which
raises wages, pensions, subsides, without corresponding real economic growth.
Price levels are stable, according to the model’s results, when for example wages and
profits grow while real production is increasing just enough to compensate for the
incremented nominal income of workers and business owners. But wages and profits
may not necessarily both increase. Prices also remain fixed in a scenario where nom-
inal wages grow while profit rates decrease: in this setting, real production does not
change but wealth distribution among social groups does. When profit rates decrease,
and the increase in total wages is greater than the drop in profits, real production
raises consistently. The opposite scenario may happen with prices remaining stable
when real production increases but wages remain fixed and the excess production is
attributed to profits. Or, in another scenario, real production does not change, but
wages decrease as a result of a raise in profit rates: prices are stable, and only a
redistribution among social groups happens. Finally, prices could be also stable if a
government increases the total wage value by reducing profit rates, for example with
taxes, or, on the contrary, may increase subsidies to and update patronage policies
for private firms, thus recovering resources from total wage.
Finally, government monetary intervention, by the definition of inflation described
in this paper, may be thought as a form of income bargaining between workers and
firms. This is an extension of Sraffian and post-Ricardian literature, which does not
assign any role to the government in their I-O model. On the opposite, in this paper,
as shown by our example estimation in Figure 3.3, we theorized that monetary fiscal
policy has an effects on prices through the channel of wages and profits. Indeed, if
workers are strong, i.e. have powerful trade unions, control a lot of newspapers and
media and millions of electors flow in the same political parties, the government, in
a perfect representative democracy, would be a representation mainly of the working
class. In that case, the government could help workers by raising wages, hiring un-
employed people, increasing pensions etc., perhaps also trying to reduce profit rates
or planning productive public investments, or simply by letting prices increase while
wages increase more than proportionally, so that profit rates decrease (workers’ pa-
tronage inflation). On the contrary, if workers’ political and trade union activity
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is quiet, companies and other employers may take advantage of their weakness by
reducing nominal wages, or increasing their profit rates, absorbing all the productiv-
ity improvements by keeping wages constant. If the government is a representation
mainly of private firms, it will mainly try to reduce taxes, subsidies, public pensions
and public employees or increase profit rates more than proportionally to inflation
through capitalist patronage inflation. Through public monetary expenditure (i.e.
non-productive expenditure creating money), the state redistributes income among
social classes, consistently with the social class that it represents at any given time.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a way to describe the inflationary trends components
with great accuracy. This process highlights how income distribution, government
monetary intervention and productivity growth are all interrelated. The model can
be used to forecast future inflation through the mixed use of the six different possible
ceteris paribus scenarios shown. The model shows that inflation depends exclusively
on nominal wage levels, rates of profits and productivity variations among the sectors
of the economy. Productivity variations are able to affect inflation in a significant
way, however, they only occur in rare scenarios: wars and sudden shortages of raw
materials. This means that inflation is mainly due to the level of profits and wages
at any given level of real production.
The monetarist approach explains inflation as a consequence of money creation by the
government and not of bargaining between workers and business owners. However,
as we discussed in the previous section, government monetary intervention affects the
final level of wages and profits (and so, indirectly, prices), but it is itself a form of
bargaining (capitalist patronage and workers patronage). This special form of bar-
gaining does not operate alone, but it takes place alongside of classical bargaining
activities between trade unions and enterprises. In subsequent studies, this model
could be used to separate the component of inflation due to government bargaining
(government monetary intervention) from that caused by collective bargaining (be-
tween companies and trade unions).
In conclusion, inflation seems to be mainly a political phenomenon of income bar-
gaining. It merges as a mix of trade-union contention on wage determination between
entrepreneurs/workers and political competition for government control (which means
control on fiscal monetary expenditure). In free-market economies, high inflation rate
periods suggest that there is a profound level of social contention between income
groups, evident both in government and business, while periods of relative stability
in prices, hint low political and trade union activity of workers with a reduction of
their economic influence on the government. A condition which recalls Europe (and
not only) in the last two decades.
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Chapter 4
Health inequalities for elderly in
Europe
4.1 Theoretical framework. Health inequalities in
Europe: the place matter
Our health is inextricably related to our geographies (Gatrell and Elliot, 2009): place
is a "mileux that exercises a mediating role on physical, social and economic pro-
cesses and which effects how such process operates" (Agnew, 2011). Nevertheless,
places are nodes of social, economic and political networks (Cummins et al., 2007)
and spatial inequalities in health are the final outcome of complex economic, social,
environmental and political processes. As argued by Bambra (2016), "places can be
health-promoting (salutogenic) or health-damaging (pathogenic)".
The literature identifies two main explanations concerning geographical inequalities
in health: compositional and contextual (Macintyre et al. 2002). According to the
compositional approach the health of a specific place is the result of the individual
behavior of people living in that area, while for the contextual explanation health
inequalities are related to economic, social and physical environmental of the area.
According to the compositional approach, the behaviours and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of people living in a particular area determine the health of the population
in such place. The main risky health behaviours (smoking, alchohol, physical activity,
diet and drugs) play a crucial role in health outcome. Smoking is related to cancer
and cardiovascular disease, being the more relevant preventable cause of mortality
in European member states (Jarvis and Wardle, 2006). On the other hand, socioe-
conomic status is the second key element in term of occupational class, income or
educational level (Bambra, 2011). Literature has well developed the concept of social
gradient in health according to which people in higher social class have a better health
than those in the class below (Marmot, 2010). Our study focuses on the contextual
explanation for the health of a specific place, recalling individual behavior only in
the final section, dedicated to econometric estimations, where they are considered as
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independent variables together to contextual variables.
The relationship between socioeconomic status and health conditions has been inves-
tigated according to three main interpretative approaches: materialist, psychosocial
and behavioural/cultural (Bartley, 2016). Materialistic theory considers income as
key elements in favouring access to goods and services and protecting by risk fac-
tors such as unhealthy diet, deprived housing conditions, exposition to environmental
and job physical condition risks. Psychosocial theory mainly concerns the impact
of domination/subordination and social support/control feelings on health. While
behavioural approach argues that unhealthy behaviours are psychologically and cul-
turally determined according to socioeconomic groups. Health, in fact, is strongly
affected by social, economic and physical environment and "place acts as a health
ecosystem" (Bambra, 2019). In this analytical approach the focus is therefore not on
the individual socioeconomic condition, but on the area-economic factors including
employment conditions, poverty rates, income level. The socioeconomic character-
istics of a place affect health of the people living in that place according to several
different mechanisms: the job that people can have access to, as well as the services
available within a perverse circle mainly driven by economic interests (poor food avail-
able in poor neighbourhoods; healthy food and physical activity opportunities may
be not present in deprived areas for example). Poverty as one of the main area-level
economic factors is a key predictor of health (Macintyre, 2007). Moreover, social
elements such as the possibility to access health care services, child care, the quality
of schools, and housing strongly affect health conditions, as well as the possibility to
implement healthy or unhealthy behaviours. The absence of safe and walkable outside
space as well as of affordable fresh food market are some of the elements contributing
to an obesogenic environment (Pearce et al., 2007). Places also shape the context
of social capital, in terms of trust, norms and networks (Putnam, 1993) mediating
between the socioeconomic conditions of people and the health outcomes (Hawe and
Shiell, 2000): higher social capital is related to better health conditions. The quality
of places as physical environment is another aspect strongly affecting the health of
the population: the negative effect of air pollution, as well as contaminated land, is
well documented by literature (WHO, 2008; Bambra, 2016; Walton et al., 2015); on
the reverse the positive influence of natural and green space (Maas et al., 2005; Abra-
ham et al., 2010). Researchers developed the concept of environmental deprivation
associated with higher mortality rate and the related concept of environmental justice
(Pearce et al., 2010).
Contextual and compositional theoretical approaches have to be considered as strongly
intertwined, and both reinforcing each other in the so called "deprivation amplifica-
tion" highlighting that individual deprivation is amplified by area deprivation (Mac-
intyre, 2007). People and places are strongly reciprocally influencing, outlining a
specific ecosystem affected by micro, meso and macro elements that are each other
related, producing health geographical inequalities. Contextual and compositional
explanations support the analysis at micro and meso levels, while another part of the
studies focused on macro level investigating the role of social, political and economic
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structures and therefore of the political choices. From this point of view, political
choices, being outside the control of individuals or local areas, have been considered
"the causes of the causes of the causes of geographical inequalities" (Bambra, 2016).
Policy matters because poverty level as well as employment and environmental con-
ditions are determined by wider political actions by national an over national level:
"politics can make us sick or healthy" (Schrecker and Bambra, 2015).
Economic recession is associated with increasing in mental illness (Gili et al., 2013;
Economou et al., 2011), and health inequalities (Bambra, 2019), nevertheless the im-
pact of the "great recession" of 2007 on health inequalities has been limited studied
also because its effect will be more evident in the next years. In comparative perspec-
tive, in Western countries, the previous economic downturns had different impact on
the population, and therefore inequalities have increased but not according the same
path in all countries (Valkonen et al., 2000; Kondo et al., 2008). More in general,
inequality characterizes western societies in neoliberal era. We refer to neoliberalism
as "a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification" (Brenner,
et al. 2010). It has been marked by promoting competition in the provision of public
services and introducing private sector management techniques to increase efficiency
and to reduce costs (Saltman et al. 2007; Harvey, 2007; Labonté, Stuckler, 2016).
Such policy context has "increased inequality" (Schrecker, Bambra, 2015) concerning
economic, social and health conditions. Income inequality is related to higher infant
mortality and lower life expectancy (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2008). Recent studies
have put the attention on the long-term health implications of the economic crisis in
2007 and the related austerity policy within the neoliberal policy framework domi-
nating European countries (Bambra, 2019). Austerity measures (cuts to central and
local governments and therefore to welfare services) have been related to an increas-
ing in mortality rate at older ages (Hiam et al 2018). Health inequalities has been
considered as one of the "neoliberal epidemics" (Schrecker, Bambra, 2015).
The literature has usually studied income inequalities linked to mortality rate, how-
ever in this paper we would shift our attention on Healthy Life Years (HLY). We
are going to investigate health inequalities in European countries focusing on HLY
for elderly in comparative perspective. The first paragraph outlines the theoretical
framework on health inequalities according to the main literature, stressing the re-
lationship between health of the population and places, outlining the main research
questions. The second part investigates data concerning changes in healthy life years
for elderly in European member states in relationship with differences in income dis-
tribution (Gini Coefficient) and welfare regime. In the last part we run econometric
estimations whose outcomes suggest some comments on HLY65+ trend in Europe in
relationship with income inequalities, social public expenditure, welfare policies and
individual health behavioral variables in the neoliberal context. The study is led by
the following research questions: 1) Within each member state, has HLY65+ changed?
2) is there a correlation between differences in income distribution (Gini index) and
differences in HLY65+? 3) Are such differences caused by income inequalities growth?
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4.2 Data and Analysis: HLY65+
Healthy life years (Eurostat), also called disability-free life expectancy, is defined as
the number of years that a person is expected to continue to live in a healthy condi-
tion (Gold et al., 2005). Data concerning HLY65+ are taken from Eurostat (Eurostat,
2018). Prevalence data were obtained by the following prompt from the annual Eu-
ropean Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey (EU-SILC). HLY65+ data
is calculated by age categories of 5 years. To the sample interviewed it was asked:
"For at least the past six months, to what extent have you been limited because of a
health problem in activities people usually do?". The possible answers are:
"Would you say you have been:
a) severely limited
b) limited but not severely
c) not limited"
The first answer is used as a proxy for identifying disabled persons, and those who
are limited or severely limited in their activity. The number of responders to a) are
summed and than they are divided by the total number of interviewed people. How-
ever, this indicator presented by Eurostat is derived from self-reported data so it is,
to a certain extent, affected by respondents’ subjective perception as well as by their
social and cultural background. The main limitation of the data is that EU-SILC
does not cover the institutionalised population, i.e., people living in health and social
care institutions who are more likely to face limitations than the population living in
private households. It is therefore likely that, to some degree, this data source under-
estimates the share of the population facing activity limitations. However, our data
analysis is already informative, even with this under-estimated index; the real health
condition of population over 65 can only be worst than the one presented in this paper.
In the literature, the great part of studies have focused their attention on the mor-
tality rate, finding recenlty, for example, that in the USA, mortality in the middle
age group of the white population has unexpectedly increased, while the same rate
calculated for all the other age groups and ethnicities continued to shrink (Deaton
and Case, 2020). However, our study does not use data on mortality, nor on life
expectancy at birth, while it focuses on healthy life expectancy after 65 years. Life
expectancy at birth or mortality rate, indeed, could remain high, even in a context
of increased inequalities, however, the quality of life could be severely reduced, which
ultimately would decrease the healthy life years. According to the life course analyt-
ical perspective (Wadsworth, 2007; Willson, 2007; Pearlin, 2005), HLY65+ reflects
the accumulation of several health determinants at individual as well as contextual
level through the whole life (Lundberg, 2008). We therefore believe it would be more
precise, for the purpose of our analysis, to use an indicator such as the HLY65 +
which, unlike the death rate or the life expectancy at birth, is more easily capturing
the long-term effects of inequalities, neoliberal policies and welfare regimes in which
the individual lives.
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Researches of causes of health inequalities (Beckfield, 2015) has demonstrated a com-
plex relationship between welfare regimes (Eikemo and Bambra, 2008; Bambra, 2007)
and the health of the population (Bambra and Eikemo, 2009); this work focuses on
analysing HLY65+ in relationship with welfare regime in European member states,
income inequality and micro-level variables such as alcohol consumption, smoking
and overweight. As we highlighted in the first paragraph micro and meso levels are
intertwined and both are related to macro structural economic and social neoliberal
features.
This study embraces the literature conceptualising the welfare state as an institutional
arrangement that distributes health (Beckeld et al., 2015). The "social determinants
of health are real and they have real consequences" (Kelly and Doohan, 2012) that
have to be considered in term of health of the population. Therefore, European states
have been classified according to four main welfare regime types, commonly known in
the literature (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Arts and Gelissen, 2002;
Bambra, 2007; Beckfield et al., 2015): Scandinavian (universalistic, strong interven-
tionist state with generous social transfers), Bismarckian (welfare programmes related
to a labour market position, and support to family), Southern (fragmented, limited
and partial coverage with a reliance on the family and voluntary sector), and Eastern
(formerly Communist countries that have limited welfare services).
Initially, HLY65+ data from 2004 to 2017 were studied carrying out the Dickey-
Fuller (D-F) test in order to skim countries that have experienced a significant trend
(both positive and negative) from those that have remained stable. The Dickey-Fuller
test tests the null hypothesis that an autoregressive model follows an increasing or de-
creasing trend (unit root). The alternative hypothesis is that the autoregressive model
moves around its fixed mean (stationarity) or around a trend (trend-stationarity) (Eu-
rostat, 2018). The tests were conducted differentiating between men and women. For
p-values greater than 0.1, the time series should be considered non-stationary. Sub-
sequently, linear regressions were conducted to study the slope of the eventual trend
and its statistical significance. Moreover, a delta analysis was run to perform variance
analysis between European minimum and maximum data.
4.3 Changes in HLY65+ within each member state
and welfare regimes
Data from WHO European region database include information not only about Euro-
pean member states but also about ex-Soviet Union Republic countries. Comparative
analysis shows that in 2015 the lowest estimated life expectancy at birth was 62,2
for male in Turkmenistan, while the highest was 85,4 for female in Spain: a gap
of 23,2 years. Within European member states the gap for male was of 12,6 years:
between 68,1 in Lithuania and 80,7 in Sweden; while for female the gap was 7,5:
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between 78 in Bulgaria and 85,4 in Spain1. Observing the female and male val-
ues, no series of HLY65+ for any country is stationary, with the exception of Spain,
Portugal, Greece, and Italy (Yes=p-value>0.1, significant trend; No=p-value<0.1,
non-significant trend). Nevertheless, Greece and Italy appear stationary according to
the D-F test since they dropped dramatically in the first years (and before 2004) and
then remained stable.
Comparative analysis of the relationship between changes in HLY65+ and welfare
regime shows that there is no common trend for the four main welfare regimes. They
have been differently affected by changes in HLY65+, but for the Southern welfare
regime the negative trend is more evident. The European average for HLY65+ re-
mained stable in the period 2004-2015. The trend is minimal (0.008) and not sta-
tistically significant, both in females (slightly decreasing) and in males (slightly in-
creasing). Nevertheless, many countries exhibit large variations; 11 countries have
worsened their HLY65+ in the last 12 years, 5 of them in a statistically significant
way, among them in descending order of severity are Bulgaria, Italy, and Greece. This
trend has also affected Denmark, a Scandinavian welfare regime, and the Netherlands,
a Bismarckian welfare regime.
On the other hand, 17 countries have improved their HLY65+ and 13 of them in
a statistically significant way (95% and 99%). Scandinavian welfare regime countries
(Sweden, Norway and Finland) mainly present positive and statistically significant
trend. Finally, 7 countries did not present a statistically significant trend.
In all countries, both the female and male trends are consistent; however, where it
is positive, it is less positive for women (except for Sweden, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
and Estonia), and where it is negative, it is worse for women (except for Denmark).
Finally, while at the European level the maximum values per year have grown at a
statistically significant rate, the minimum values have not experienced a statistically
significant trend.
The chart shows the countries ordered from the higher variation in terms of improve-
ment of the trend in HLY65+. The first glance at the table reveals immediately the
high inequality among EU countries: 8 nations have worsened their HLY65+; 8 na-
tions have not exhibited any significant trend and 13 countries have improved their
HLY65+. This outcome reflects the absence of a common health policy in EU; each
country competes each other and the final outcome, as usual, is that there are some
winners on the one hand, and some looser on the other one. Countries which deterio-
rated their HLY65+ most are Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Greece. Their trends are
showed in the following chart, in comparison with EU country which has performed
best in term of HLY65+ over the period analyzed: Sweden. Data are considered from
2004 to 2017. For Italy and Greece data would be available from 1995, but this is not
the case for Bulgaria and Romania, therefore we can only show the HLY65+ trend of
these countries in a single common graphic starting from 2004.
1Source: European Health for All database (WHO): https :
//dw.euro.who.int/api/v3/export?code = HFA_70
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Figure 4.1: The worst countries ad HLY65+ trend against the best one, 2004-2017, Source: Euro-
stat
In 2017, the HLY65+ for a Swedish female was 15.8, while for Greek female was
7.8; and for Swedish male 15,4 while 8.1 for Greece males. As the chart shows, the
worst countries in Europe, as for HLY65+, aggravate their index between 2004 and
2010; after that, they remain approximately steady. On the opposite, Sweden trend
increase over the whole period except for a brief pause between 2010-2013 where it
suspended its growth. This general trend between worse countries and the better one,
applies to both males and females.
It is interesting to note that Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Italy, which performed
worst, have been severely affected by changes in the demographic composition, due to
young population migration outflows and elderly of staying population. For example,
in Italy the total migration outflow passed from 9.121 people in 2000 to 40.551 in
2017, while Greece increased its outflow mainly after the economic crisis in 2008 pass-
ing in a single year, from 2009 to 2010, from 15.732 to 47.125 people. In general, the
people who emigrate from these countries are not compensated by immigration flows,
except for Italy, but also in this case the problem is that the new immigrant in general
earn lower pays, and in turn pay less taxes, i.e. less resources are available to take
care of old people. On the other hand, there is the permanent problem of residential
population ageing, that in general characterizes the Western industrialized countries.
In Italy, according to OECD statistics, the percentage of people 65 years old and more
was 16.5% in 1995 but 22.3% in 2017; in Greece was 15.3% and 16.2% in 2017; in
Romania was 17.6% in 1995 but 25.9% in 2017 and finally, in Bulgaria the percentage
was 22.2% in 1995 and in 2017 was 31.1% (Source: European Core Health Indicators).
The population ageing implies that health systems need of more resources to work
well; on the other hand, however, the problem is that the percentage of workforce on
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total population decreases, therefore, ceteris paribus, there are less tax receipts and
then less resources. The bad performance of these four countries is explained not only
by institutional reforms (neoliberal policies) but also by demographic dynamics.
The table above, shows that on the one hand the maximum value increased for both
Table 4.1: Maximum and minimum HLY65+, sex disaggregated data, 2004, 2017 and Delta
2004 2017 Delta absolute value Delta %
Male Max 13.3 (Denmark) 15.4 (Sweden)
Male Min 4.6 (Estonia) 4.1 (Latvia)
Male Gap 8.7 11.6 2.9 33
Female Max 13.5 (Denmark) 15.8 (Sweden)
Female Min 3.8 (Portugal) 4.1 (Slovakia)
Female Gap 9.9 13 3.1 31
the female (from 13.7 to 16.8) and male population (from 13.3 to 15.7); on the other
hand, the minimum value decreased for males (from 4.6 to 4.1) and it is stationary
for females (3.8). Nevertheless, the male minimum data is still above the female level,
showing that part of the female European population has worsened HLY65+ com-
pared to the male one. Moreover, the gap between maximum and minimum values
in Europe (Delta%) increased for both the male (33%) and female population (31%),
and it is wider for females (13 years against 11.6 for males). The absolute difference
(delta absolute value) between male and female gap increased too, respectively of 2.9
and 3.1.
4.4 Income inequality and HLY65+
In this section we link the trend in HLY65+ of EU countries with an index of income
inequality. Economic inequality, indeed, is a typical characteristic of neo-liberal era
and it is linked, as Literature has already stated, to health inequalities. The huge
inequality in health conditions among countries that we have just studied in the pre-
vious chapters, is also reflected in income distribution. The empirical evidence, is
that high level of income inequality is associated to low level of public health.
To find this relationship we adopt, as proxy of income distribution, the well-known
Gini index. The Gini index varies from 0 to 1 (0 perfect distribution, 1 a single person
earns all the income of the country) so that the higher the index is, the higher the
income inequality is. The idea is to compare the Gini index average trend (from 2004
to 1995) with the average trend of HLY65+ (from 2004 to 2017), for all of the 28
EU countries (plus Norway). By this way, we will not simply compare HLY65+/Gini
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index for a single year. On the opposite, we are comparing how a long-term trend
(positive or negative) in Gini Index is associated to a long-term trend (positive or neg-
ative) in HLY65+. We estimated the average trend in Gini index with a simple OLS
model (Data are in table A1 of Appendix). Income inequality was measured with
the Gini index provided from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID). The SWIID is based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and offers
comparable high-quality data.












































The chart shows the evidence of a negative link between Gini index and HLY65+.
Indeed, in that countries where the income distribution has concentrated most over
the period observed, the expectance of healthy life after 65 years has followed (on
average) a declining trend. An outlier is Sweden: it is the first country in Europe as
HLY65+ increment meanwhile it exhibits one of the highest Gini index increments.
Other countries which do not perfectly fit the general trend are Slovakia and Poland,
where inequalities have strongly reduced while HLY65+ has remained quite stable (a
slight decline). The other countries, on the other hand, respect the general trend. By
the graph the countries which perform best (i.e. high HLY65+ increment joint to high
Gini index decrement) are Finland, Belgium, Portugal, Estonia and Czech Republic.
On the other part, the countries which perform worst (i.e. High HLY65+ decrease
joint to high Gini index increase) are Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia, Italy, Greece and
Romania.
Now we want to test if this correlation between income inequality and HLY 65+
is also a causation. Until now, indeed, we only found a negative correlation between
Gini index and HLY65+, but correlation does not mean causation. In order di con-
clude our study about the linkage inequality-HLY65+ we need to do an econometric
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estimation. We consider 27 countries of European Union (except Croatia because of
the lack of data) plus Norway, over a period of 23 years (1995-2017). The last year is
2017 since it is the last available for HLY65+ while Croatia has excluded as Eurostat
provides HLY65+ data only for a few years. We used Eurostat data for HLY65+,
SWIID database for Gini Index and the World Health Organization database for the
other control variables. We get a large panel database, complete of all European
countries (except Croatia), that we used to set-up our estimations. We initially run a
Pool OLS regression in order to test which regression model would be the best. The
Breusch-Pagan statistical test rejects the hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is
adeguate (p-value = 1.18e−195) in favor of Random Effects and Fixed Effects model.
The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, therefore the Fixed Effects model is
adeguate (p-value = 0.0002).
According to compositional approach, both behaviors and socioeconomic character-
istics of people living in a particular area affect the health of the population in such
place. As for behavior variables, we plug in the model the percentage of population
overweight (Bmi index, Bmi> 30). The International Obesity Task Force (IOTF)
and the WHO have raised awareness of the magnitude of obesity and its impact on
morbidity and mortality, quality of life, and cost of healthcare (2000) and a WHO re-
port (2003) on diet and health recognizes the impact of obesity on the development of
some of the most widespread chronic diseases, namely, type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, skeletal-muscle pathology, and several types of cancer. The three main key
behavioural variable are therefore alcohol consumption, overweight rate and tobacco
consumption.
As for socioeconomic characteristics we plug in the model the income inequality mea-
sured by the Gini index, the per-capita social expenditure of the State, the per-capita
GDP and the percentage of Migrated people over the population. Gini index is the
most common inequality index, therefore, to test our hypothesis (income inequalities
affect healthy life), we plug it in the estimating equation of the panel model. We add
a cross product variable of Gini index and per-capita GDP in order to test how the
effect of inequality on HLY65+ changes according to the level of income. We also
regress HLY65+ on an other income inequalities index as a robustness check of our
findings. As other measures of income inequality we use the ratio of the average in-
come of the 20% richest to the 20% poorest (S80/S20). Both of them are provided by
Eurostat. The social public expenditure count for elements such as the possibility to
access health care services, child care, the quality of schools and housing; the higher
the quality and the accessibility of these services is, healthier the life is (Bambra,
2019). Together to social public expenditure it is important to consider the Migra-
tion effects on HLY65+. We finally distinguish HLY65+ for males and females. The
estimation equation is:
HLY 65+i,t = αi + β1INQi,t + β2gdpi,t + β3INQi,t ×GDPi,t+
+ β4SOEXi,t + β5OVWi,t + β6MIGi,t + εi,t
(4.1)
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Table 4.2: Panel Model: HAC (Robust SE), dependent variable HLY65+





INQ 3.7072 3.0255 4.3867 4.5036 6.3043
(0.6583)*** (0.5856)*** (0.7594)*** (1.5135)*** (2.0080)***
INQ×GDP −0.3774 −0.3067 −0.4449 −0.4557 −0.6248
(0.0664)*** (0.0593)*** (0.0766)*** (0.1543)*** (0.2047)***
gdp 9.3267 7.4038 11.1555 0.8758 1.4404
(1.9923)*** (1.7800)*** (2.2979)*** (0.8748) (0.1620)
SOEX 9.28e-4 8.57e-4 9.55e-4 7.68e-4 8.95e-4
(1.38e-4)*** (1.21e-4)*** (1.59e-4)*** (1.26e-4)*** (1.70e-4)***
OVW −0.1135 −0.0516 −0.1776 −0.0595 −0.2051
(0.0478)** (0.0426) (0.0551)*** (0.0425) (0.0566)***
MIG 0.0646 0.0594 0.0683 0.0671 0.0785
(0.0168)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0194)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0200)***
Const − 82.9373 −67.4523 −97.8595 −2.0807 −0.8236
(20.1028)*** (2.1589)*** (1.3188)*** (8.7334) (11.6153)
F-Test 5.3e-128*** 5.7e-139*** 7.4e-116*** 2.7e-137*** 2.6e-110***
Observations 441 449 441 437 429
R− Squared 0.8152 0.8314 0.7875 0.8368 0.7831
*Significance Level: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
Where αi is the ith-country fixed-effect; INQ is the inequality index; gdp is the loga-
rithm of per-capita GDP; SOEX is the social expenditure of the government; OVW
is the percentage of overweight population and MIG is the percentage of migrated
people over population. The Wald joint test on the dummy-time variables states that
there are no temporal effects (p-value = 0.2684).
In all the five models the inequality the indexes of income inequality are all statistical
significative and their socioeconomic interpretation is the same: an increase in the
GDP of a country rises the negative effect of income inequality on the expected life
years after 65+. In the poorest European countries, income inequality has a lower
effect on HLY65+ while in the richest ones it affects HLY65+ in a stronger way. For
example, in Norway, one of the highest per-capita income European country, income
inequality is expected to have reduced HLY65+ by 8 years from 1995 to 2017. The
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other control variables have consistency sign.The logarithm of GDP always affects
positively the level of HLy65+ and the social public expenditure, as expected, is
strongly and positively linked to the HLY65+ improving its values the higher it is.
Migration affects HLY in a statistical significantly way with a positive sign; this fact
could be interpreted by considering the young age that on average characterize the
migrant population. These estimations suggest the inflows of foreign young people
should improve the HLY65+, perhaps because they make-up for the lack of man-
power concurring in paying taxes and therefore to finance the social expenditure and
other social services. Finally, the model confirms the wide literature on the effect of
overweight on public health. Also for the case of HLY65+, the higher the overweight
population, the lower the expected healthy life is. As for the differences between males
and females these estimations reveal a similar force of impact for income inequality
variables, migration and social expenditure. What is more different is the impact
magnitude of GDP and overweight on female population. Females health seem to
be affected by the level of per-capita GDP stronger than males (11.1555 vs 7.4038).
However, it is even more evident the impact of overweight on expected healthy years
65+; overweight impacts far more stronger females than males (−0.1776 vs −0.0595).
4.5 Health inequalities in Europe: policy matter in
neoliberal era
The comparative analysis of an HLY65+ represents a key indicator in investigating
health inequalities (Salomon et al 2013; Stiefel, 2010; Robine, 1992). This study
extends, and updates some of the main results in health inequalities literature (Mack-
enbach, 2006; Beckfield, 2018), adding more evidence concerning the HLY65+ trend
between 2004 and 2015. HLY65+ within each European member state exhibited
no consistent trend: in some countries increased and others decreased, showing the
presence of severe health inequalities. Findings highlight a positive performance in
most of the Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway and Finland), Bismarckian (Germany,
Belgium, Austria, France) and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia Hungary)
welfare regime countries, and a negative trend for Southern welfare regime (Italy and
Greece). Nevertheless, the negative trend in HLY65+ had also affected a Scandi-
navian country (Denmark), a Bismarckian case (the Netherlands) and four Eastern
Europe countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Croatia), highlighting that none of the
welfare regimes has been immune to such neoliberal epidemic, even if the Southern
regime has been more vulnerable.
The sex differences in HLY65+ confirmed in this study have been observed in other
studies (Crimmins and Saito, 2001; Baerlocher, 2007; Jagger et al., 2008) showing
that on average, women tend to live longer than men and in better health conditions.
Nevertheless, the health inequalities in HLY65+ is higher for female than for male
population, showing that female are more effected by such trend. Female population,
more than male population, has been more exposed to such inequality epidemic, pay-
ing the price of a decreasing in HLY65+. Sex disaggregated data usually show both
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similar trends and small differences by gender. The female population usually presents
better HLY65+, but this was not observable in all countries. In Italy and in Greece,
compared to the average of European countries, females present worse HLY65+ espe-
cially after the year 2006. Despite the decrease in HLY65+ in Denmark, the female
population has been less affected by such a trend, while in Sweden, the increase has
been wider than for the male population showing an advantage position for the female
population in such Scandinavian countries.
Analysis on the causation between differences in income inequalities and HLY+65
push forward the debate on the role of macro elements on health of the population.
We run our estimations on one of the widest and most complete database in the lit-
erature, that we built-up for the purpose of this paper. Our estimates confirm the
crucial role played by income inequalities in the causation of health inequalities in a
robust way, using two different indexes of economic inequalities distinguishing both
for males and female. Moreover, migration seems to improve the expected healthy
life years for elderly population while the overweight is a severe problem, affecting
HLY65+ in a strong and negative way. Finally, our estimations reveals that the coun-
try effect is significative, i.e. the welfare regime adopted by countries matters (the
country fixed-effect is statistical significative). As shown by this study, therefore, con-
sidering the wider mechanism in health inequities (Kriznik et al., 2018), place matter
because policy matters: ’social welfare matter’ (O’Campo et al., 2015), confirming the
main literature on neoliberal welfare policy and health inequalities (Högberg, 2017),
(Kwarteng et al., 2013; Kriznik, 2018; Farrants, 2017; Högberg, 2017). Inequalities in
HLY65+, are a result, above all, of macro political factors, "are socially produced and
therefore are potentially avoidable and widely considered unacceptable in a civilised
society" (Lynch, 2017). Such inequalities being "unfair and stemming from some form
of injustice" (Whitehead, 2007), "could be avoided by reasonable means" (Kawachi et
al., 2002). Keeping the focus on macro neoliberal policy dimensions should avoid the
risk for further neoliberal derive towards individualisation of inequalities, as victim
blaming approach, and medicalisation of inequalities (Lynch, 2017).
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Table 4.3: Maximum and minimum HLY65+, sex disaggregated data, 2004, 2017 and Delta
Country Welfare Regime Presence of Trend D-F test (Male+Female) OLS OLS Female OLS Male
Positively Trend statistically significant
1. Sweden Scandinavian YES 0,342*** 0,359*** 0,343***
2. Norway (no EU) Scandinavian YES 0,282*** 0,248*** 0,289***
3. Ireland Bismarckian YES 0,278*** 0,278*** 0,278***
4. Malta Hybrid YES 0,271*** 0,288*** 0,300***
5. Cyprus Southern Europe YES 0,217** 0,222** 0,137*
6. Finland Scandinavian YES 0,187*** 0,162*** 0,210***
7. Estonia Eastern Europe YES 0,167*** 0,195*** 0,139***
8. Portugal Southern Europe NO 0,165* 0,168* 0,163**
9. Belgium Bismarckian YES 0,140*** 0,165*** 0,115***
10. Czech Republic Eastern Europe YES 0,128*** 0,126*** 0,095**
11. Hungary Eastern Europe YES 0,108*** 0,080*** 0,127***
12. Austria Bismarckian YES 0,068 0,044* 0,092**
13. France Bismarckian YES 0,010*** 0,091*** 0,108***
Trend statistically not significant
14. Luxemburg Bismarckian YES 0,013 -0,07 0,096
15. Germany Bismarckian YES 0,0259 0,012 -0,036
16. Lithuania Eastern Europe YES 0,043 0,032 -0,003
17. Spain Southern Europe NO 0,082 0,092 0,071
18. Poland Eastern Europe YES -0,017 0,004 -0,060
19. UK Liberal YES -0,038 -0,019 -0.020
20. Slovakia Eastern Europe YES -0,04 -0,015 0,011
21. Slovenia Eastern Europe YES -0,095 -0,177** -0,066
Negatively Trend statistically significant
22. Latvia Eastern Europe YES -0,071** -0,070 -0,071**
23. Netherlands Bismarckian YES -0,093** -0,154*** -0,036
24. Denmark Scandinavian YES -0,163*** -0,151*** -0,176***
25. Greece Southern Europe NO -0,191*** -0,215*** -0,166***
26. Romania Eastern Europe YES -0,196** -0,232** -0,160**
27. Italy Southern Europe NO -0,287*** -0,332** -0,237***
28. Bulgaria Eastern Europe YES -0,292*** -0,295** -0,192**
29. Croatia Eastern Europe YES -0,386** -0,407** -0,365**
European Union - NO 0,047* 0,013 0,033**
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Final Considerations
Income inequalities appear to be heavily influenced by ICT innovations and bargain-
ing among social groups. In Chapter 1 we found that productivity growth over the
last two decades has been indisputably driven by ICT; in turn, productivity growth
over the period under review has affected the number of full-time permanent jobs,
negatively and in a strongly statistically significant way. With a forecast based on
the equation estimated, we easily found that in the next 30 years, it is likely that
more than 60% of full-time permanent jobs will be replaced by unemployment and
occasional jobs, a trend already confirmed by the OECD data since the 1980s.
These outcomes suggest that an important change in the structure of job market is
taking place. In Chapter 2 we update and confirm the trend already found in the
literature: we are moving towards an economy where there is less need for routinary
jobs (replaced by artificial intelligence softwares) and more need of not-routinary
jobs (more difficult to be replaced by machines). This revolution in the labor mar-
ket has important consequences on income distribution. Indeed, the routinary jobs
are traditionally associated to the middle-income professions, while not-routinary jobs
involve both high-income (not-routniary and skilled) and low income professions (not-
routinary and not skilled). The thinning of the middle class is a direct effect of the
great improvements brought about by the fourth industrial revolution, so it can hardly
be reversed, at least in the short term. The political consequences of the middle class
thinning could be explosive for liberal systems, since in a superstar economy the me-
dian voter theorem no longer holds.
In addition to technological factors, income inequalities are also affected by social
dynamics. In Chapter 3 we try to show it from a price-level perspective. We found
that inflation is mainly influenced by three source of variables: the income distribu-
tion among the working class and managers/owners; what we call "the government
monetary intervention" that is the creation of money to finance state spending; pro-
ductivity growth. The latter has already investigated in the previous chapters and,
consistently with common economic knowledge, an increment in productivity, ceteris
paribus, reduces the price level. However, the first two variables affect inflation much
more strongly. The level of profit and wages of the economy, that is a direct conse-
quence of bargaining among firms and trade unions, is the main source of inflation
trend. Furthermore, the creation of money by the government, that the monetarist
approach typically associates to inflation, could be seen itself as a form o bargaining
among social groups in what we call "capitalist patronage" and "workers patronage".
Finally, social groups also compete for the welfare regime, which in turn affects the
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final income distribution. In Chapter 4 we run a comparative analysis among Euro-
pean countries using HLY65+ as a key indicator in investigating health inequalities
and associating it to the different welfare regimes chosen by each nation and its level
of income distribution. The analysis has confirmed that Scandinavian welfare regime
presents the best outcome in term of HLY65+. Individual (micro) and area (meso)
deprivations are summed and affected by political-neoliberal (macro) level. Inequal-
ities in HLY65+, as results of micro, meso, but above all macro political factors,
are socially produced and therefore are potentially avoidable: only the bargaining of
disadvantaged social groups could reverse this trend.
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